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THE 1982 AMENDMENTS TO THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT: A STATUTORY ANALYSIS 
OF THE REVISED BAILOUT 
PROVISIONS 
RICHARD A. WILLIAMSON* 
I. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, AS AMENDED: 
AN OVERVIEW 
A. Introduction and Summary of the Original Act 
On June 29, 1982, President Reagan signed the Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1982.1 At the signing ceremony, the President de-
clared that the legislation constituted the "longest extension of the act 
since its enactment [in 1965] and demonstrates America's commitment 
to preserving [the right to vote]."2 The President also stated that the 
amendments extended the "special provisions applicable to certain 
states and localities, while at the same time providing an opportunity 
for the jurisdictions to bail out from the special provisions when 
appropriate."3 
The Voting Rights Act of 19654 has been described variously as "one 
• Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of Wil-
liam and Mary; B.B.A. Ohio University (1965); J.D. Ohio State University (1968). 
1. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 
to 1973aa-6 (1982)). 
2. Remarks on Signing H.R. 3112 into Law, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 847 (June 29, 
1982). 
3. ld 
4. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 
to 1973bb-1 (1982)). 
1 
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of the most significant pieces of civil rights legislation ever enacted,''5 
as "designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination 
in voting,"6 and as an act that "commits linguistic mayhems on the 
Constitution."7 It was enacted under the legislative authority conferred 
by section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, section 2 of the fifteenth 
amendment, and article I, section 4 of the Constitution. 8 Some of the 
Act's provisions were permanent and applicable nationwide; other pro-
visions were temporary and applicable only in designated areas. 
The provisions of the original Act applicable nationwide included 
section 2, which prohibited the imposition or application of racially 
discriminatory voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting;9 section 
3, which authorized the courts to apply the remedies established by the 
Act's special provisions on a case-by-case basis in areas other than 
those covered by the legislative designation of states and political sub-
divisions subject to the Act's special provisions;10 section 10, which 
contained a legislative declaration that poll taxes violate the fifteenth 
amendment and which instructed the Attorney General to bring suit to 
5. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as TEN YEARS AFTER]. For a discussion of earlier federal efforts to end 
racial discrimination in voting, see Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 V AND. 
L. Rev. 523 (1973); Note, Federal Protection of Negro Voting Rights, 51 VA. L. Rev. 1051 (1965). 
For a discussion of the constitutional issues presented by the original version of the Act, see Chris-
topher, Tlze Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 STAN. L. Rev. 1 (1965); Cox, 
Constitutionality of the Proposed Voting Rights Act of 1965, 3 Hous. L. Rev. 1 (1965). 
6. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). 
7. Ervin, Tlze Truth Respecting the Highly Praised and Constitutionally Devious Voting Rights 
Act, 12 CuM. L. Rev. 261,279 (1982). Senator Ervin described the constitutional infirmities of the 
Act as follows: "[The] Act treats with contempt the constitutional prohibition of congressional 
bills of attainder, the due process clause of the fifth amendment, and the doctrine of the constitu-
tional equality of the states." I d. at 273. 
8. H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965) (''The bill, as amended, is designed 
primarily to enforce the 15th amendment to the Constitution of the United States and is also 
designed to enforce the 14th amendment and article I, section 4.") [hereinafter cited as 1965 
HOUSE REPORT]. 
9. The original version of Section 2 provided: 
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure shall 
be imposed or applied by any state or political subdivison to deny or abridge the right of 
any citizen on account of race or color. 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (amended 1975). The 1975 
amendments to the Act substituted "race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth 
in section [1973b(f)(2) of this title]" for "race or color." See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 206, 89 Stat. 402 (amended 1982). 
10. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 3, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1973a (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). 
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bar their use; 11 and two sections which provided civil and criminal 
remedies for violations of the Act. 12 In addition, section 4( e) of the Act 
provided that no person who successfully completed the sixth primary 
grade in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was 
other than English, could be denied the right to vote because of an 
inability to read or write English. 13 
The most significant provisions of the Voting Rights Act, however, 
were contained in the complex scheme of special remedies aimed at 
areas of the country where voting discrimination was most flagrant. 
Section 414 prescribed a formula (hereinafter referred to as the "cover-
age formula") by which certain states and political subdivisions were 
identified for special treatment (hereinafter referred to as "covered ju-
risdictions"). 15 Jurisdictions became subject to the special provisions of 
the Act if they maintained a test or device (statutorily defined) as a 
prerequisite to registration or voting as of November 1, 1964, and had 
less than a fifty percent registration rate as of that date or less than a 
fifty percent turnout for the 1964 presidential election. 16 Among the 
special remedies provided by section 4 was the immediate suspension 
II. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 10, 79 Stat. 442 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1973h ( 1982)). The Supreme Court in Harper v. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 
(1966), held that imposition of a poll tax violates the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth 
amendment. Additionally, the twenty-fourth amendment, ratified in 1964, prohibits the use of 
poll tax as a condition of voting in federal elections. 
12. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 11-12, 79 Stat. 443-44 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973i-1973j (1982)). Among the prohibited acts are refusing to permit 
eligible voters to vote, failing to tabulate the votes of eligible voters, intimidating or threatening a 
person for voting or attempting to vote, and providing false information when registering to vote. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973i (1976). The penalties for violations of the Act include fines of up to $5,000 or 
imprisonment for up to five years, or both. Jd § 1973j. 
13. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(e), 79 Stat. 439 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973b(e) (1982)). The constitutionality of this provision was upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
384 u.s. 641 (1965). 
14. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 438 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1982)). 
15. Jd The use of a selective coverage formula was held constitutional in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 307, 329-33 (1966). 
16. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 438 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1982)). The coverage determinations were made by the Attorney Gen-
eral based upon data supplied by the Director of the Census, and were not subject to judicial 
review. ld By Apri~ 1966, coverage determinations had been made with respect to the states of 
Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia, forty counties in 
North Carolina, four counties in Arizona, Honolulu County in Hawaii, and Elmore County in 
Idaho. TEN YEARS AFTER, supra note 5, at 13. The coverage determination could be made either 
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of the right to use tests and devices as prerequisites to voting in the 
covered jurisdictions. 17 Section 5,18 perhaps the most controversial pro-
vision of the Act, prohibited covered jurisdictions from implementing 
new voting qualifications and procedures different from those in effect 
on November 1, 1964, without a finding by the Attorney General or a 
three-judge panel of the District Court for the District of Columbia 
that the changes were not discriminatory in purpose or effect. 19 Section 
for the state as a whole or for local political subdivisions in the event the entire state was not 
subject to coverage. See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text. 
17. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 438 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c), (f)(3) (1982)). Under the 1965 Act, the phrase "test or device" was de-
fined as: 
Id 
any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting 
(I) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demon-
strate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) pos-
sess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by voucher of registered voters 
or members of any other class. 
18. Id § 5, 79 Stat. 439 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982)). 
19. Id A covered jurisdiction seeking to implement a new voting qualification or procedure 
has a choice whether to seek the prior approval of the Attorney General or approval through the 
declaratory judgment process in the District of Columbia District Court. If the jurisdiction elects 
to seek the approval of the Attorney General, the new provision may be implemented unless the 
Attorney General objects within sixty days of the submission. Id While a covered jurisdiction 
may not appeal the Attorney General's objection to a submission, it may thereafter file a declara-
tory judgment action in the District Court for the District of Columbia seeking judicial approval 
of the same submission, and the court will undertake a de novo review of the matter. Id Cf. 
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 391 (1971) (Attorney General's interpretation of§ 5 is ac-
corded "great deference"). 
The provision for administrative approval by the Attorney General was designed to give cov-
ered jurisdictions a rapid method of securing implementation of proposed changes in voting quali-
fications and procedures. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 549 (1969). The provision 
limiting preclearance through the judicial process to the District of Columbia District Court was 
designed to ensure uniform judicial interpretation of the§ 5 standard. Voting Rights: Hearings on 
S. 1564 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 69-73 (1965) (testimony of Attor-
ney General Katzenbach) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Senate Hearings]. See also infra notes 167-80 
and accompanying text. 
During the period from 1965 through 1981, over 39,000 preclearance requests were submitted to 
the Attorney General. Bills to Amend the Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975, S. 
1992, and H.R. 3112 Before the Subcomm on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judici· 
ary, 91th Cong., 2d Sess. 1742-43 (1982) (attachment C-1 to statement of Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Reynolds) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Senate Hearings]. During approximately the same 
period, only twenty-three declaratory judgment actions were filed. Keady & Cochran, Section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act: A Time for Revision, 69 KY. L.J. 741, 750-53 (1981). The preclearance 
requirement applies to any unit of government within the geographic territory of a covered juris-
diction that proposes to implement a new voting qualification or procedure. United States v. 
Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110 (1978). See infra text accompanying notes 204-05. 
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5 has been broadly construed20 to require covered jurisdictions to seek 
preclearance of a wide variety of laws and practices, including changes 
in qualifications or eligibility for voting, publicity about voting or regis-
tration, balloting and assistance to voters, and methods of determining 
the outcome of elections.21 In addition, preclearance is required for 
any changes in the boundaries of voting precincts or in the location of 
polling places;22 changes in the constituency of officials or the bounda-
ries of political subdivisions, such as by redistricting, annexation, or 
reapportionment; and changes to at-large elections from district elec-
tions or changes to district elections from at-large elections.23 Finally, 
covered jurisdictions are required to seek preclearance for any change 
in the method of determining the outcome of an election (e.g., by re-
quiring a majority vote), any change affecting the eligibility of persons 
to become or remain candidates, any change in the term of elective 
office or in the offices that are elective, any change affecting the neces-
sity of, or methods for, offering issues for approval by referendum, or 
any change affecting the right or ability of persons to participate in 
political campaigns.24 The remaining special remedies that apply only 
to covered jurisdictions include the authority of the Attorney General 
20. In Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), the Court stated: "[W]e must 
reject the narrow construction ... [of] § 5. The Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as 
well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote 
because of their race." /d. at 565. The Court continued, "It is significant that Congress chose not 
to include even . . . minor exceptions in § 5, thus indicating an intention that all changes, no 
matter how small, be subject to§ 5 scrutiny." /d. at 568. See also Georgia v. United States, 411 
U.S. 526, 534-35 (1973) (preclearance required for any change that has the "potential" for vote 
dilution). 
21. 28 C.F.R. § 51.12(a), (b), (f) (1983). See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 
(1969) (preclearance required for changes in the procedure for casting write-in votes). 
22. 28 C.F.R. § 51.12(d) (1983). See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971) (preclearance 
required for changes in the location of polling places). 
23. 28 C.F.R. § 51.12(e). See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971) (preclearance re-
quired for reapportionment plan and for proposed annexation); Allen v. State Bd of Elections, 
393 U.S. 544 (1969) (preclearance required when covered jurisdiction proposes to change from 
single-member districts to at-large elections). 
24. 28 C.F.R. § 51.12(1)-(k). See Board ofEduc. v. White, 439 U.S. 32 (1978) (preclearance 
required for new local school board policy mandating that employees take unpaid leave-of-ab-
sence when running for public office); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) 
(preclearance required for changes in candidate eligibility rules and changes from elective to ap-
pointed offices). 
For a treatment of the scope of the preclearance requirement, see generally H. BALL, D. KRANE 
& T. LAUTH, COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS Acr 
(1982) [hereinafter cited as COMPROMISED CoMPLIANCE]; MacCoon, The Enforcement of the 
Preclearance Requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 CATH. U.L. REv. 197 
( 1979). 
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upon certification to assign federal examiners to list eligible persons for 
registration and to appoint observers to report on the conduct of 
elections. 25 
The special provisions in the original Act were designed to be effec-
tive for a maximum period of five years from the date when a jurisdic-
tion was determined to be covered.26 Though there was no fixed 
calendar date upon which the Act's special provisions would expire, a 
covered jurisdiction could exempt itself from coverage (hereinafter re-
ferred to as "bailout") if it could carry the burden of proving, in a de-
claratory judgment action before a three-judge panel of the District 
Court for the District of Columbia, that it had not used a test or device 
with a discriminatory purpose or effect for the five year period prior to 
the filing ofthe action.27 Covered jurisdictions, therefore, could be rea-
sonably certain that the special provisions would terminate no later 
than the expiration of five years from the date of coverage, since under 
section 4 their right to employ tests and devices was suspended when 
they became covered. Some jurisdictions sought to bail out prior to the 
expiration of the five-year period, and thus had to demonstrate that 
their tests and devices in effect before coverage had not been adminis-
tered with a discriminatory purpose or effect for at least the preceding 
five-year period from the date bailout was sought.28 
25. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 6-9, 79 Stat. 439-41 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973d-1973g (1982)); see infta notes 230-45 and accompanying text. 
26. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 438 (amended 1970). 
27. Id Section 4(a) also provided that no declaratory judgment could be obtained if, during 
the five-year period, a final judgment had been entered in any court of the United States, deter-
mining that the jurisdiction had denied persons the right to vote on account of race or color 
through the use of tests or devices. Id The original bailout standard also incorporated a de 
minimis limitation. A covered jurisdiction would not be held to have engaged in the use of tests or 
devices with a discriminatory purpose or effect if the incidents of such use were few in number and 
prompt, corrective action was taken, if the continuing effects of such use were eliminated, and if 
there was no reasonable probability of their recurrence in the future. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(d), 79 Stat. 438 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(d) (1982)), 
28. During the first five years of the Act, the State of Alaska, Wake County in North Caro-
lina, Elmore County in Idaho, and three countries in Arizona successfully obtained early termina-
tion of their obligations under the special provisions. TEN YEARS AFTER, supra note 5, at 14. 
Two other North Carolina counties, Nash and Gaston, were unsuccessful in their attempts to bail 
out during the same period. 1982 Senate Hearings.. supra note 19, at 1787. See infta notes 118-34 
and accompanying text. 
Number 1] VOTING RIGHTS ACT AMENDMENTS 7 
B. Summary of the 1970 and 1975 Amendments 
In 1970, Congress, following lengthy hearings,29 concluded that 
while substantial progress had been made under the Act, racial dis-
crimination in voting continued and the section 5 preclearance man-
date had been enforced only minimally.30 In August, 1970, Congress 
passed the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970.31 The 1970 
amendments extended the effective period of the section 5 preclearance 
requirement and the other special provisions of the Act for an addi-
tional five-year period; that is, section 4(a) of the Act was amended to 
require covered jurisdictions seeking bailout to demonstrate that they 
had not used a test or device with a discriminatory purpose or effect for 
ten years prior to the time bailout was sought. 32 Congress also amended 
the coverage formula and brought under the Act's special provisions 
those jurisdictions that maintained a test or device as a prerequisite to 
registration or voting on November 1, 1968, and which had less than a 
fifty percent registration rate on November 1, 1968, or less than a fifty 
percent turnout for the 1968 presidential election.33 Finally, Congress 
passed a nationwide five-year ban on the use of tests and devices as a 
prerequisite to registration and voting.34 
29. Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 818, S. 2456, S. 2507, and 
1itle IV of S. 2029 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 
9lst Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1970); Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearings Before Subcomm. No.5 of 
the House Judiciary Comm., 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
30. H.R. REP. No. 397, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1910House Report]. 
No written Senate Report was submitted with the 1970 amendments. 
31. Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 315 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-l (1982)). 
32. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 3, 84 Stat. 315 (1970) 
(amended 1975). 
33. 1d § 4, 84 Stat. 315 (1970) (amended 1975). 
The 1970 coverage formula resulted in coverage of the boroughs of the Bronx, Brooklyn, and 
Manhattan in the city of New York, one county in Wyoming, two counties in California, eight 
counties in Arizona, four election districts in Alaska, Elmore County in Idaho, and various towns 
in Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maine, and Massachusetts. TEN YEARS AFTER. supra note 5, at 
14-15. Eight of these jurisdictions (Elmore County, the Alaska election districts, and three of the 
eight Arizona counties) had exempted themselves after being covered by the original Act. See 
.rupra note 28. 
34. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 201, 84 Stat. 315 
(amended 1975). 
The 1970 amendments also included provisions that prohibited denying to any citizen 18 years 
of age or older the right to vote on account of age, prohibited the application of state durational 
residency laws for voting in presidential elections, and established uniform standards for registra-
tion and absentee balloting in presidential elections. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 91-285, §§ 202,302, 84 Stat. 316 (codified at42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-l (1982)). The consti-
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During the period immediatley preceding and following the passage 
of the 1970 amendments, activity under the section 5 preclearance re-
quirement increased perceptibly. It was during this period that the 
Supreme Court broadly construed the section 5 mandate35 and the De-
partment of Justice first issued regulations to provide guidance to cov-
ered jurisdictions with respect to their preclearance obligations.36 Prior 
to 1970, section 5 had been widely ignored.37 
As 1975 approached, Congress again was faced with the question 
whether to allow the special provisions to expire for those jurisdictions 
originally covered. Hearings were held,38 and while it was clear that 
the number of blacks registered to vote had increased dramatically dur-
ing the preceding ten years, 39 Congress found that a significant dispar-
ity still existed between the percentages of black and white registered 
voters, that compliance with section 5 was still a problem, and that con-
tinuation of the preclearance mandate was necessary to guarantee that 
the 1980 reapportionment process would be free from racial 
gerrymandering.40 
tutionality of the nationwide prohibition on the use of tests and devices was sustained in Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). That decision also upheld the constitutionality of the abolition of 
state durational residency limitations and the uniform registration and balloting provisions for 
presidential elections. The Court, however, declared the 18-year-old vote provisions unconstitu· 
tiona! as applied to state elections. For a treatment of the Mitchell case, see Greene, Congressional 
Power Over the Elective Franchise: The Unconstitutional Phases of Oregon v. Mitchell, 52 B.U.L. 
REv. 505 (1972). 
35. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 398 U.S. 544 (1969); see also supra notes 20-24 and 
accompanying text. 
36. The current regulations are contained in Procedures for the Administration of Section S 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.1-.17 (1983). 
37. See WASHINGTON REsEARCH PROJECT, THE SHAMEFUL BLIGHT: THE SURVIVAL OF RA· 
CIAL DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING IN THE SOUTH 138 (1972); see also Perkins V. Matthews, 400 
U.S. 379, 393 n.ll (1971). Only 578 preclearance submissions were made through the year 1970. 
COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE, supra note 24, at 244-45 (table). 
38. Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 407, S. 903, S. 1297, S. 1409, 
and S. 1443 Bf!fore the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 94th 
Cong., lst Sess. (1975); Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before tl1e Subcomm. on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
39. Between 1964 and 1972, 1,148,621 new black voters had been added to the list of eligible 
voters in the covered jurisdictions. TEN YEARs AFTER, supra note S, at 41. 
40. See generally S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 
SENATE REPORT]; H.R. REP. No. 196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 
HousE REPORT]. Pre-Act estimates placed the percentage of white and black registered voters in 
the covered states at 73.4% and 29.3%, respectively. By 1972, the gap had narrowed to 67.8% for 
whites, compared to 56.6% for blacks. TEN YEARS AFTER, supra note S, at 43. Nearly 6,000 
preclearance submissions were filed between 1971 and 1975, inclusive. 1982 Senate Hearings, 
supra note 19, at 1742 (table). 
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In 1975, the Act again was amended41 to continue the special provi-
sions in covered jurisdictions for an additional seven years, bringing to 
seventeen years the period of time a jurisdiction covered by either the 
1964 or 1968 coverage formulas would have to show the absence of the 
use of a test or device with a discriminatory purpose or effect in order 
to terminate coverage under the Act's special provisions.42 The 1975 
amendments also made permanent the five-year nationwide ban that 
had been imposed in 1970 on the use of tests or devices.43 Finally, 
based upon testimony presented at the hearings, Congress extended the 
protection of the Act to members of language minority groups.44 Con-
gress amended the definition of "test or device" to include the use of 
English-only election material in states or political subdivisions in 
which a single-language minority comprises more than five percent of 
the voting age population.45 It then extended the coverage of the Act's 
special provisions to those jurisdictions that maintained a test or device 
(as newly defined) as of November 1, 1972, and had a registration or 
voter turnout rate of less than fifty percent in the 1972 presidential 
election.46 
Congress also developed a new program to aid minority-language 
voters. In any state or political subdivision in which more than five 
percent of the voting age population are members of a language minor-
ity group and in which the illiteracy rate of such groups is greater than 
the national illiteracy rate, all written election material, including bal-
41. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 402 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982)). 
42. ld §§ 101, 201, 206, 89 Stat. 400-02 (amended 1982). 
43. ld § 201, 89 Stat. 315 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (1982)). 
44. The legislative history of the 1975 amendments discloses that while Congress heard evi-
dence of physical intimidation and economic reprisals against Mexican-American voters, its pri-
mary concern was with the language difficulties encountered. See 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra 
note 40, at 23-35; 1975 HousE REPORT, supra note 40, at 16-27. The protections afforded by the 
1975 amendments extend to language minority voters of American Indian, Asian-American, and 
Alaskan Native descent, in addition to those of Spanish heritage. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(e) 
(1976). 
45. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 203, 89 Stat. 401-02 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(3) (1982)). 
46. Jd § 202, 89 Stat. 401 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1982)). Jurisdictions 
included under the 1975 coverage formula were the entire states of Alaska and Arizona, two coun-
ties in California, one county in Colorado, five counties in Florida, two townships in Michigan, 
one county in North Carolina, and three counties in South Dakota. /982 Senate Hearings, supra 
note 19, at 1722-24. Jurisdictions falling within the 1975 coverage formula because of the lan-
guage minority provisions are required to provide election material in the language of the applica-
ble language minority group. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(4) (1982). 
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lots, must be provided in the language of the applicable minority 
group.47 
Jurisdictions covered under the Act's special provisions by the 1975 
coverage formula could seek to bail out upon showing that no test or 
device had been used with a discriminatory purpose or effect for the 
ten-year period preceding the filing of a declaratory judgment action.48 
No specific bailout mechanism was provided for those jurisdictions 
covered only by the minority language assistance provisions; instead, 
they were required to meet the requirements for a ten-year period.49 
C Progress Under the Act and the Pressures to Revise and Extend 
the Act in 1982 
During the period from 1965 to 1981, most structural impediments to 
minority registration and voting were removed, minority registration 
and voting increased significantly, and, as a consequence, the number 
of elected minority officials grew dramatically in covered states. 50 By 
1980, for example, in South Carolina, one of the states originally cov-
ered by the special provisions of the Act, nearly 56% of the black vot-
ing-age population was registered, compared to roughly 62% of the 
white voting age population;51 pre-Act estimates placed the registra-
47. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 301, 89 Stat. 402-03 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(b) (1982)). The 1975 amendments also required that a covered 
jurisdiction which provides other materials or information relating to the election process must 
provide them in the language of the applicable minority group. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(c) 
(1976). If the applicable minority language is unwritten or historically unwritten, the covered 
jurisdiction must provide oral assistance to minority language voters. /d For purposes of this 
section of the Act, illiteracy means the failure to complete the fifth primary grade. Id § 1973aa-
la(b). 
The Department of Justice has interpreted the minority language provisions as requiring that 
the covered jurisdiction provide materials and assistance "in a way designed to allow members of 
applicable language minority groups to be effectively informed of and participate effectively in 
voting-connected activities." 28 C.P.R. § 55.2(c) (1983). Jurisdictions covered only by language 
assistance provisions are listed in Implementation of the Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Re-
garding Language Minority Groups, 28 C.P.R. pt. 55 appendix. Some jurisdictions are covered by 
both the traditional special provisions and the special language assistance provisions. /d 
For a treatment of the language minority provisions, see U.S. CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 
THE VOTING RIGHTS Acr: UNFULFILLED GoALS 76-88 (1981) (hereinafter cited as UNFULFILLED 
GOALS]. 
48. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 101, 89 Stat. 400 (amended 
1982). 
49. I d. § 301, 89 Stat. 402 (amended 1982). 
50. UNFULFILLED GOALS, supra note 47, at 11. 
51. Id. at 20. In North Carolina (where less than the entire state is covered) and Louisiana, 
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tion figures at about 37% and 76%, respectively.52 Although there are 
no reliable figures on the number of elected black officials in the cov-
ered states prior to passage of the Act, one estimate has placed the 
number well under one hundred.53 By 1980, the number of elected 
black officials in the eight covered southern states exceeded two 
thousand. 54 
Despite impressive gains in voting and in the election of minority 
candidates in the jurisdiction covered by the Act's special provisions, 
evidence of continued discriminatory practices and tendencies re-
mained, at least in the view of civil rights groups. In anticipation of 
congressional consideration of the need for another extension of the 
Act in 1982 (the year in which the special provisions would expire for 
those jurisdictions covered), the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights55 conducted an investigation and issued a report56 concerning 
the status of voting rights in the covered jurisdictions. The report noted 
that while minority registration rates had increased significantly begin-
ning in 1965, they continued to lag behind the registration rates for 
white voters. 57 The Commission attributed the disparity to discourte-
ous and intimidating attitudes of registration officials, inaccessible re-
gistration sites, and the practice of purging registration lists without 
notice of the need to reregister. 58 The Commission also noted contin-
the gap between white and black registration rates was slightly higher. In Louisiana, the 1980 
registration rates were 76.4% for whites and 61.1% for blacks. In North Carolina, the rates for 
white and black voters were 71.9% and 55.2% respectively. Id 
52. TEN YEARS AFTER, supra note 5, at 43. The largest gap in registration rates for whites 
and blacks prior to adoption of the 1965 Act was in Mississippi, where the pre-Act estimate was a 
69.9% registration rate for whites and a 6.7% registration rate for blacks. Id 
53. Id at 49. By 1968, there were 156 elected black officials in the seven Southern states 
originally covered in their entirety. Id 
54. UNFULFILLED GOALS, supra note 47, at 12; see also Extension of the Voting Rights Act: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2180 (1981) (table) [hereinafter cited as 1981 House Hearings). As 
impressive as the gains have been, the proportion of elected black officials relative to the black 
population in covered jurisdictions remains relatively low. Id at 2188-89 (table 2.3). 
55. The United States Commission on Civil Rights is an independent, bipartisan agency es-
tablished by Congress in 1957. See Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1975 (1982)). Among the duties of the Commission are studying and collecting informa-
tion concerning discrimination, appraising the laws and policies of the federal government, and 
issuing interim reports to the President and to Congress. Id § 1975(c). 
56. UNFULFILLED GOALS, supra note 47. 
57. /d at 22. 
58. 1d at 22-28. The report noted that many of the problems of access to the voter registra-
tion process may be attributed to the fact that registration traditionally is an urban, business-hour 
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ued discriminatory practices related to voting.59 The Commission 
found evidence that minority voters were inhibited in exercising their 
right to vote because of the presence of inconvenient, inaccessible, or 
intimidating polling places; because of inadequate assistance for illiter-
ate voters; because of harassment and intimidation of minority voters 
at the polls and the absence of minority election workers and officials; 
and because of the discriminatory use of absentee ballots.60 
Finally, the Commission concluded that while compliance with the 
Act's preclearance mandate had increased significantly during the pe-
riod from 1975 through 1981, the number of objections by the Attorney 
General to proposed changes in voting procedures and practices was 
high,61 and an analysis of the nature of the objections disclosed that 
most of the proposed changes to which objections were raised would 
have had a significant adverse impact on minority voters.62 On the ba-
sis of its overall findings, the Commission recommended extension of 
the special provisions of the Act for an additional ten years.63 
During the 1970's, one additional voting concern developed that was 
to have a significant impact on congressional deliberations over the 
need to extend the special provisions of the Act. The Voting Rights Act 
had had the effect of eliminating the direct barriers to increased minor-
ity voting. Tests and devices as prerequisites to registration and voting 
process. The report asserts that, as of 1977, 44% of the black population in the South lived in non-
metropolitan areas, and 39% existed below the poverty level. The registration process is made 
difficult because many cannot afford transportation to the registration location or because the 
registration office is closed before they can get there to register. Id. at 25. 
59. I d. at 29. 
60. Id. at 29-37. 
61. I d. at 66. The most recent Department of Justice statistics reveal that a total of 39,837 
preclearance requests had been processed as of September 30, 1981. 1982 Senate Hearings, supra 
note 19, at 1745. The number of objections interposed in response to the submissions was 695 
during the same period. Id. at 1784. 
The Civil Rights Commission report argued that while the number of submissions had in-
creased in recent years, many covered jurisdictions continued to implement changes without first 
obtaining approval. UNFULFILLED GoALS, supra note 47, at 70-73. 
62. UNFULFILLED GoALS, supra note 47, at 65, 70. In 1980, the last full year for which 
records are available, 10 of the Attorney General's 39 objections were related to the method of 
electing local officials; 8 dealt with redistricting; and 7 concerned annexation. 1982 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 19, at 1784. 
63. UNFULFILLED GoALS, supra note 47, at 91. The Commission also recommended ex-
tending the minority language provisions for an additional seven years, amending§ 2 of the Act to 
provide for an "effects" or "results" standard of proof, and adding a provision to the Act provid-
ing for damages against local officials who fail to comply with the preclearance requirement. I d. 
at 91-93. 
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had been eliminated in the covered jurisdictions (later, the prohibition 
on the use of tests and devices had been extended nationwide) and cov-
ered jurisdictions had been precluded from implementing new voting 
practices and procedures without first demonstrating that the proposed 
changes had no discriminatory purpose or effect. Neither the 
preclearance mechanism nor the provision suspending tests and de-
vices, however, had had an impact on the use of various electoral sys-
tems in effect in covered jurisdictions at the time of the passage of the 
Act.64 At the time the Act was adopted, numerous political bodies in 
the covered jurisdictions were elected through the use of multimember 
districts.65 Minorities within covered jurisdictions that employed mul-
timember or at-large methods of electing officials alleged that such sys-
tems diluted their collective voting power. 66 Constitutional challenges 
64. The prohibition on the use of tests or devices as prerequisites to registration or voting is 
limited by the statutory definition of tests or devices. See supra note 17; text accompanying note 
45. The preclearance requirement applies only when a covered jurisdiction proposes to change an 
existing registration or voting procedure or to implement new procedures. See supra text accom-
panying notes 18-24. 
65. The use of multimember districts in state legislative elections and in the election oflocal 
government officials is common in the covered jurisdictions. UNFULFILLED GOALS, supra note 47, 
at 42-58. Nationwide, most municipalities with populations of less than 100,000 use some form of 
multimember district system. Sanders, Tlte Government of American Cities: Continuity and Change 
in Structure, 1982 MUN. Y.B. 178, 180 (table) (published by the International City Management 
Association). 
66. The dilution phenomenon attendant at-large election has been described as follows: 
For example, in any town, city, or county, each member of the local governing body can 
be elected by all the voters (elected at large) or by only the voters of a particular district 
(elected by single-member district). In a town of 10,000 registered voters with a gov-
erning body composed of 10 members, this would mean that all10,000 voters could cast 
ballots for all 10 members of the governing body, or that the voters, grouped into 10 
districts of approximately 1,000 voters each, would be able to elect one member of the 
governing body to represent their particular district. 
In certain circumstances, the consequences for minority representation of these differ-
ent voting methods can be significant. If, for example, the town contains a majority of 
white voters, who consistently refuse to vote for minority candidates (that is, there is 
racial bloc voting), an at-large election system has the effect of denying minority voters 
the opportunity to elect a minority to office. In contrast, elections from single-member 
districts, some of which contain more than 50 percent minority voters, would make mi-
nority representation on the governing body much more likely. 
UNFULFILLED GoALs, supra note 47, at 38. See generally Berry & Dye, Tlte Discriminatory Effects 
of At-Large Elections, 7 FLA. ST. L. REv. 85, 86 n.lO (1979); Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to At-
Large Elections: Tlte Dilution Problem, 10 GA. L. REv. 353 (1976). 
The adverse impact of at-large electoral systems is heightened when employed in conjunction 
with so-called "anti-single-shot" laws, requirements that candidates run for designated slots or 
ballot places, residence requirements, staggered terms, and majority vote requirements. See UN-
FULFILLED GOALS, supra note 47, at 39-40; Comment, Tlte Standard of Proof in At-Large Dilution 
Discrimination Cases After City of Mobile v. Bolden, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 103, 118 (1981). 
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to the maintenance of multimember districts were widespread, 67 often 
including allegations that multimember districts violate section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act.68 Prior to 1980, the challengers had achieved mod-
est success,69 but the 1980 Supreme Court decision in City of Mobile v. 
Bolden 10 seemingly ended any further constitutional or section 2 chal-
lenges to the maintenance of multimember electoral systems. The plu-
rality opinion71 in Bolden held that "action by a State that is racially 
neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth Amendment only if motivated 
by a discriminatory purpose;"72 that the fifteenth amendment prohibits 
"only purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgement . . . of the 
67. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 
(1980); Perkins v. City ofW. Helena, 675 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1982); Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 
913 (4th Cir. 1981); Leadership Roundtable v. City of Little Rock, 661 F.2d 701 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(per curiam); Aranda v. Van Sickle, 600 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 
(1980). 
68. See, e.g., United States v. Uvalde Consol. lndep. School Dist., 625 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 
1980); Mcintosh County Branch of the NAACP v. City of Darien, 605 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1980). 
69. See, e.g., Perkins v. City ofW. Helena, 675 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1981); Calderon v. McGee, 
584 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1978); Perry v. City of Opelousas, 515 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1975); Wallace v. 
House, 515 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1975); Ausberry v. City of Monroe, 456 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. La. 
1978). 
70. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). For treatments of the Bolden decision, see Hartman, Racial Vote 
.Dilution and Separation of Powers: An Exploration of the Co'!flicl Between the Judicial "Intent" and 
the Legislative "Results" Standard, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 689 (1982); Parker, The "Results" Test 
of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715, 729-46 
(1982); Note, City of Mobile v. Bolden: Voter .Dilution and New Intent Requirements Under the 
Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 18 Hous. L. REV. 611 (1981); Co=ent, City of Mobile v. 
Bolden: A Setback in the Fight Against .Discrimination, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 169 (1980). 
The plaintiffs in Bolden alleged that the at-large method of electing city commissioners diluted 
the voting strength of blacks in violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments and section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The district court agreed that the system violated the fourteenth 
and fifteenth amendments and ordered the city to utilize a mayor-council system wherein council 
members would be elected from single-member districts. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 
384 (S.D. Ala. 1976), qf!'d, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
71. Justice Stewart's plurality opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell 
and Rehnquist. Justice Stevens concurred in the result, but rejected the analysis of the plurality 
opinion. 446 U.S. at 90 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens argued that voter dilution claims 
should be resolved by resort to an analysis of the objective effects of particular methods of electing 
officials. Id Justice Blackmun also concurred in the reversal of the court of appeals, but on the 
ground that the remedy imposed was inappropriate under the circumstances. See id at 80-83 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun, however, was of the view that the factual findings 
supported the conclusion that the city was guilty of illegal vote dilution. Id at 81. Justices Bren-
nan, White and Marshall dissented. See id at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting); ld (White, J., dissent-
ing); id at 94 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
72. Id at 62. 
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freedom to vote;'m that the legislative history of section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act "makes [it] clear that it was intended to have an effect no 
different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself;"74 and that the 
fourteenth amendment equal protection mandate requires that a chal-
lenger to a multimember district prove that the district "conceived or 
operated [a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial ... discrimination."75 
Reaction to the Bolden decision was predictable. At a minimum, 
Bolden was described as creating confusion as to the standard of proof 
necessary to establish a violation of the Constitution and section 2 of 
the Act.76 Others, however, condemned the decision as a break with 
precedent, and, insofar as section 2 was concerned, as incorrectly con-
struing congressional intent.77 
The constitutional aspects of the Bolden decision are, of course, not 
subject to legislation revision. Congress does not possess the power to 
legislate a reinterpretation of the elements of a substantive violation of 
the fourteenth of fifteenth amendments.78 On the other hand, Congress 
does have the power, conferred by section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment and section 2 of the fifteenth amendment, to enforce the substan-
tive rights of each amendment by "appropriate legislation."79 It is well 
established that his grant of legislative power is not limited to the 
power merely to legislate against that which is already prohibited by 
the substantive provisions of each amendment.80 Moreover, Congress 
clearly has the power to declare its intent.81 The aspect of the Bolden 
73. Jd at 65 ("Having found that Negroes in Mobile 'register and vote without hindrance,' 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals were in error in believing that the appellants invaded 
the protection of that Amendment in the present case."). Five justices, however, disagreed with 
the conclusion. Jd at 84 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring); id at 80 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id at 
103 (White, J., dissenting); id at 128-29 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting). 
74. ld at 61. Justices Stevens, B1ackmun, and White did not discuss the§ 2 issue. 
75. Jd at 70 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971)). 
76. H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 HousE 
REPORT). 
77. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-19 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 SENATE 
REPORT). 
78. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 643, 651 n.lO (1966); 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra 
note 77, at 41. 
79. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646 n.5 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
u.s. 301, 327 (1966). 
80. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 
641, 648 (1966). 
81. The 1982 amendment to§ 2 was for the express purpose of declaring the congressional 
intent that a violation of the statute could be established by showing the discriminatory effect of 
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decision that construed congressional intent with respect to section 2 of 
the original Act to constitute nothing more than a legislative restate-
ment of the fifteenth amendment was, therefore, subject to legislative 
revision. 82 Congress could declare its intent with respect to section 2 in 
clear and unambiguous terms, thus negating the Bolden decision, sub-
ject only to the requirement that the remedial relief provided consti-
tutes "appropriate legislation" to enforce the fifteenth amendment. 
.D. Congressional .Deliberations on the 1982 Extension: .Development 
of the New Bailout Standard 
Congressional deliberations concerning the need for another exten-
sion of the Act in 1982, therefore, were complicated by pressures to 
respond to (and revise) the Bolden decision with respect to section 2 of 
the Act. A number of bills83 were introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives, including H.R. 3112 by Representative Rodino, that pro-
posed a ten-year extension of the special provisions of the Act (seven 
years for the minority language assistance provisions) and a modifica-
tion of section 2 to provide for a "results" standard of proof. Represen-
tative Hyde also introduced bills84 that sought to impose a "results" test 
under Section 2 and that would have replaced the alternative Justice 
Department-District of Columbia District Court preclearance require-
ment with an exclusively judicial preclearance system. Under the Hyde 
bills, preclearance would have been required, but the only approval 
mechanism would have been in the District of Columbia courts. Rep-
the challenged practice. See 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 29; 1982 SENATE REPORT, 
supra note 77, at 2. 
82. McMillan v. Escambia County, 688 F.2d 960, 961 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982); Taylor v. Haywood 
County, 544 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 (W.D. Tenn. 1982). 
83. At the outset of the hearings, the House Judiciary Committee had before it six bills to 
amend the Act. These bills appear in the 1981 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 70-84, 163-67. 
Representative Rodino's bill, H.R. 3112 (which ultimately was approved by the House, as 
amended), proposed an amendment to section 2 which would have caused the section to read as 
follows: 
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure 
shall be imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision in a manner which 
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote 
on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 
4(t)(2) [of Voting Rights Act of 1965]. 
Seeid at 71. 
84. 1981 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 72, 163. Representative Hyde originally proposed 
two bills, H.R. 3198 and H.R. 3473. Later in the course of House deliberations, he introduced a 
third bill, H.R. 3948. See id at 1856; see also infta note 94. 
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resentative Hyde's original proposals were based upon his fear of 
"summary administrative procedure[s]" and his "deeply held belief 
that the laws of [the] country should properly be adjudicated in its 
courts rather than in the offices of its prosecutors."85 
The House Judiciary Committee commenced hearings on the various 
bills on May 6, 1981. After seven weeks of hearings at which more 
than one hundred witnesses testified, 86 the committee reported H.R. 
3112, as amended. The vote to report the bill as amended was 23 to 1, 
with Representative Butler of Virginia casting the only negative vote. 87 
Most of the testimony offered in the course of the House hearings con-
cerned the need for an extension of the special provisions of the Act 
and the need to revise section 2 because of the Bolden decision. Little 
consideration was given to the bailout mechanism until Representa-
tives Hyde and Lungren introduced a bill88 on June 17 to alter the 
method by which covered jurisdictions could terminate coverage under 
the Act's special provisions. Under the then-existing scheme of the Act, 
as previously described,89 proposals to extend the special provisions of 
the Act were, in reality, merely extensions of the time period for which 
covered jurisdictions were required to prove the absence of the use of a 
test or device in order to obtain bailout through declaratory judgment 
proceedings. For most covered jurisdictions, bailout was determined 
with reference to a fixed calendar date-the required waiting period.90 
85. 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 54. 
86. 1981 House Hearing, supra note 54, at iii-viii. 
87. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 3;see 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 61-
74 (dissenting views of Rep. Butler). The final version ofH.R. 3112 approved by the House con-
tained a modification to § 2 imposing an effects or results test and making the preclearance re-
quirement permanent except for those jurisdictions that met the revised bailout standard. The text 
of H.R. 3112 as approved by the House is contained at 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 48-
53. 
88. H.R. 3948, contained at 1981 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 1845-61, provided that a 
covered jurisdiction seeking to bailout would have to show 
that (l) no such test or device has been used by such State or subdivision during the ten 
years preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or with the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account ofrace or color, or in contravention of the guaran-
tees set forth in section 4(t)(2); (2) such State or subdivision has during that ten-year 
period made all the submissions to the Attorney General required under section 5; 
(3) the Attorney General has not successfully interposed any substantial objection with 
respect to any such submissions; and (4) such State or subdivision has engaged in con-
structive efforts designed permanently to involve voters whose right to vote is protected 
by this section in the electoral process. 
Jd at 1858-59. 
89. See supra text accompanying notes 32 & 41-42. 
90. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28. 
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The Hyde-Lungren Bill sought a means through which covered juris-
dictions could bail out (achieve "rehabilitation") by showing adherence 
to criteria and guidelines significantly more strict than previously had 
been required. Under this proposal, the special provisions would have 
continued indefinitely, but bailout would have been permitted for those 
covered jurisdictions that had a record of compliance with the Act and 
those that had made constructive efforts to eradicate discriminatory 
voting practices which had been permitted to remain in effect under the 
"grandfather'' clauses of the Act.91 The Hyde-Lungren Bill sought to 
make bailout "difficult, but not unreasonable," and sought to provide a 
procedure which would "isolate" those jurisdictions which failed to 
qualify, thereby providing an additional "therapeutic" incentive 
through the "disapproving focus" that would be generated throughout 
the rest of the nation.92 
The Hyde-Lungren bailout proposal did not meet with outright op-
position. The minority staff of the House Subcommittee on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights, of which Representative Hyde was the ranking 
minority member, engaged in negotiations with virtually every civil 
rights group interested in the Act's extension.93 The sponsors then 
agreed to modify their proposal in several respects.94 At the last mo-
ment, however, before the full House Judiciary Committee was to meet 
for a "markup" session on July 31, additional changes were made 
(some of which later were disowned by the sponsors) and a new bailout 
mechanism was discussed by the full committee.95 The same day, the 
91. 1981 HousE REPORT, stipra note 76, at 54 (supplemental views of Reps. Hyde and 
Lungren). 
92. I d. at 55. The Hyde-Lungren proposal was not, however, the first congressional attempt 
to alter the bailout system. In 1975, Senator Scott and Representative Butler introduced legisla-
tion to alter the bailout system. Although their efforts were defeated, the amendment offered by 
Representative Butler closely resembled the scheme proposed by Representatives Hyde and Lun-
gren. For an analysis of Representative Butler's proposal, see O'Rourke, Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1982: The New Bailout Provision and Virginia, 69 VA. L. REv. 765, 779-81 (1982). 
93. 1981 HousE REPORT, st~pra note 76, at 55. Representatives Hyde and Lungren did not 
identify any parties to the negotiation process other than the Congressional Black Caucus. /d. 
94. /d. at 55-51. Among the changes agreed to by Representatives Hyde and Lungren were: 
{I) that all bailout suits would be before a three-judge panel of the District Court for the District 
of Columbia; (2) that the interposition of any objection to a preclearance submission during the 
preceding ten-year period would bar bailout as would any adverse final judgment that was entered 
during the ten-year period finding voting rights discrimination; (3) provision for a ten-year proba-
tionary period; (4) the addition oflanguage further defining the constructive efforts required; and 
(5) extension of the present bailout standard until 1984. I d. 
95. I d. at 56; see also fd. at 62 (dissenting views of Rep. Butler). 
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full committee reported H.R. 3112, as amended to include a revision of 
section 2 and to incorporate a new bailout mechanism based in part on 
the Hyde-Lungren proposal. Representative Butler's version of the 
events leading to the amended bailout provision recited that the new 
language was introduced less than one hour prior to the committee vote 
and that the only members of the committee aware of the content of the 
amended bailout provision were those members privy to the closed 
door session in which the bailout amendment was "negotiated."96 Ac-
cording to Representative Butler, neither the sponsors of the proposal 
nor the staff had analyzed the impact of the provision, and the full 
committee had had no opportunity to examine the bailout amendment 
or object to its content.97 
Despite the allegedly flawed committee process leading to the bailout 
amendment, the committee voted to report the Bill, as amended, by a 
23 to 1 margin, with Representative Hyde voting in favor of the legisla-
tion despite his reservations concerning the constitutionality of the 
bailout amendment and his opinion that the revised language made 
bailout impossible as a practical matter.98 The full House approved the 
Bill by a vote of 389 to 24 on October 5, 198J.99 
Action in the Senate began on January 27, 1982, when the Subcom-
mittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee com-
menced hearings on five bills relating to the Voting Rights Act which 
had been introduced and referred to the subcommittee, including S. 
1992 (introduced by Senators Mathias and Kennedy), identical to the 
legislation approved by the House in October, 1981.100 The subcom-
mittee held nine days of hearings, and on March 24 met to consider S. 
1992. By a 3 to 2 vote, it approved amendments to S. 1992 which had 
the effect of transforming the Bill into a straight ten-year extension of 
the Act. 101 The subcommittee also rejected the new bailout mechanism 
96. Jd at 62. 
97. Jd 
98. ld at 57 (supplemental views of Reps. Hyde and Lungren). 
99. 1982 SENATE REPoRT, supra note 77, at 3. 
100. The various Senate Bills, S. 53 (introduced by Senator Hayakawa), S. 1761 (introduced 
by Senator Cochran), S. 1975 (introduced by Senator Grassley) and S. 1992 (introduced by Sena-
tor Mathias and Senator Kennedy} may be found atl982 Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 28-49. 
S. 1992 was cosponsored by 63 Senators. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 3. 
101. See 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 107-87. The Senate Subcommittee on the 
Constitution was critical of the House Judiciary Committee hearings, alleging that the House gave 
no opportunity for individuals opposed to changes in the Act to testifY. Id at 125. The full 
Senate Judiciary Committee subsequently approved S. 1992, as amended, by a 5-0 vote. I d. at 3. 
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and nullified the House action which had added a "results" test under 
section 2. 
On May 4, 1982, the full Senate Judiciary Committee agreed to an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute for the subcommittee Bill of-
fered by Senator Dole for himself and the sponsors of the original S. 
1992.102 The substitute amendment offered by Senator Dole reinstated 
most of the original text of S. 1992, including the new bailout provi-
sions adopted by the House, and offered clarifying language concerning 
the "results" test of section 2.103 The Judiciary Committee rejected a 
number of amendments to the Dole Bill offered by Senator East and 
ordered the bill favorably reported by a vote of 17 to 1,104 The full 
Senate approved the House version of the bill after amending its lan-
guage to contain the text of the Senate Bill, as amended. 105 The full 
House approved the Senate changes on June 23, 1982, and on June 29, 
1982, President Reagan signed the legislation. 106 
E. Summary of the New Bailout Provisions 
Although the amendments to section 2 to produce a "results" test 
constituted the most controversial aspect of the 1982 amendments to 
the Act, as judged by the congressional deliberative process, the adop-
tion of a new bailout system for the special provisions of the Act may, 
in the long run, generate even more controversy. Under the new provi-
sions, 107 a covered jurisdiction, including a political subdivision within 
a state covered in its entirety, may terminate coverage if it can carry the 
burden of proving in a declaratory judgment action brought before a 
three-judge panel of the District of Columbia District Court that it and 
each governmental unit within its geographic territory, for the ten-year 
period prior to filing the petition: (1) no test or device has been used 
with a discriminatory purpose or effect; (2) no federal court has issued a 
final judgment declaring that the jurisdiction denied or abridged voting 
102. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 3-4. The Dole proposal was also cosponsored by 
Senators DeConcini, Grassley, Metzenbaum, Biden, and Simpson. 
103. The Dole proposal inserted subparagraph (b) of the final version of the Act, and intro-
duced the twenty-five year time limit on the duration of the Act that is contained at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973b(a)(l}(8) (1982). 
104. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 4. 
105. 128 CONG. REc. S7139 (daily ed. June 18, 1982). 
106. Id at H3840-41 (daily ed. June 23, 1982); see supra text accompanying notes 1-3. 
107. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat. 131 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a}(l)-(9) (1982)). 
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rights; (3) the jurisdiction has not entered into any consent decrees, set-
tlements or agreements which have resulted in abandonment of a chal-
lenged voting procedure; (4) no action is then pending at the time the 
bailout suit is filed alleging that denials or abridgments of the right to 
vote have occurred anywhere in the jurisdiction; (5) neither the Attor-
ney General nor a court has assigned federal examiners or observers to 
the covered jurisdiction; (6) the covered jurisdiction has complied with 
all the preclearance provisions of section 5 and has not enforced non-
submitted changes; (7) the Attorney General has made no objection to 
any submission for preclearance, other than those objections over-
turned by a court; (8) no court has denied a declaratory judgment ac-
tion under section 5 with respect to a submission of a voting change; 
and (9) no submission to the Attorney General or declaratory judgment 
actions under section 5 are pending. Moreover, the jurisdiction seeking 
to terminate coverage must demonstrate that it and each governmental 
unit within its geographic territory have taken positive and constructive 
steps to end voting discrimination by (1) eliminating voting procedures 
and methods of election that inhibit or dilute equal access to the electo-
ral process; (2) engaging in efforts to eliminate intimidation and harass-
ment of persons exercising rights protected under the Act; and 
(3) engaging in other constructive efforts, such as expanded opportunity 
for convenient registration and voting and the appointment of minority 
persons as election officials. 108 
Under the bailout mechanism as it existed under the Act prior to 
1982, a jurisdiction subject to the Act's special provisions knew of a 
certain date at which time its obligations would terminate. 109 While 
compliance with the Act's special provisions was required, there was no 
special incentive for a covered jurisdiction to compile an enviable rec-
ord of compliance with the letter and spirit of the Act; conversely, a 
covered jurisdiction was subject to no special penalty that would pro-
long coverage in the event that compliance with the special provisions 
was less than complete. 110 Representative Hyde, who first proposed 
modification of the bailout mechanism, sought to end the arbitrary na-
108. Jd § 1973b(a)(4)(f). 
109. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28. 
110. The sole criterion for bailout was compliance with the § 4 mandate suspending the right 
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ture of length of coverage by providing a method through which cov-
ered jurisdictions with good track records could disassociate themselves 
from those jurisdictions with a less than total commitment to nondis-
criminatory voting practices and procedures.111 Representative Hyde 
sought a bailout mechanism that was strict, but reasonably achievable; 
the final version, in his opinion, made bailout highly unlikely as a prac-
tical matter, thereby creating "severe constitutional repercussions." 112 
Since bailout is now possible for each political subdivision (as statu-
torily defined) within a covered jurisdiction regardless of the status of 
the covered parent state, it is likely that litigation concerning the new 
bailout criteria will be voluminous. The bailout criteria themselves are 
vague, and judicial interpretation will be necessary to clarify standards. 
The remainder of this Article will be devoted to a critical examination 
of the new bailout criteria, including an examination of the legislative 
history. Before proceeding to an analysis of the new bailout provisions, 
it would be instructive to consider briefly the bailout system as it ex-
isted prior to 1982, including the judicial interpretation given to section 
4(a) ofthe Act that made bailout for most covered jurisdictions depen-
dent almost entirely on the mere passage of time. 
II. PRE-1982 BAILOUT 
The special provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as the earlier 
discussion noted, 113 were designed, in theory, to last indefinitely; no 
expiration date was provided. In practical effect, however, a covered 
jurisdiction could terminate coverage with reasonable certainty by 
means of a declaratory judgment action brought upon the expiration of 
five years (later amended to ten and then seventeen years) from the 
date it became subject to the special provisions. The test for bailout 
was whether the covered jurisdictions had refrained from using a test 
or device with discriminatory purpose or effect for the applicable statu-
tory·period.U4 Since the right to impose tests and devices as a prereq-
uisite to registration or voting was suspended on the date of coverage, 
to employ tests or devices as prerequisites to registration or voting. See 26 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) 
(1976) (amended 1982). 
Ill. 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 54-55 (supplemental views of Reps. Hyde and 
Lungren). 
112. Id at 57. 
113. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28. 
114. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
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by definition, 115 the state (assuming that it complied with the suspen-
sion mandate) would prevail in the declaratory judgment action simply 
by waiting the required number of years before filing the bailout 
petition. 
Bailout prior to the expiration of the applicable maximum waiting 
period as determined from the date of coverage was possible, and sev-
eral jurisdictions successfully obtained early termination of their obli-
gations under the Act. 116 These jurisdictions successfully demonstrated 
that their tests and devices in effect prior to the date of coverage had 
not been administered with a discriminatory purpose or effect for the 
required statutory period; in each case where bailout was permitted 
prior to the expiration of the applicable maximum statutory waiting 
period as determined from the date of coverage, no objection to bailout 
was made by the Department of Justice. 117 
For most jurisdictions, however, including the southern states and 
localities originally targeted for coverage, early bailout was made virtu-
ally impossible because of the interpretation given section 4(a) of the 
Act in Gaston County v. United States. 118 Gaston County was one of 
forty political subdivisions in North Carolina originally covered in 
March, 1966.119 It sought to terminate coverage by a declaratory judg-
ment action filed on August 18, 1966, in the District of Columbia Dis-
trict Court. Gaston County's suit was the first bailout action which 
went to trial, although four other jurisdictions earlier had obtained 
bailout when their motions for summary judgment were granted with 
the consent of the Attorney General. 120 
The legislative history of section 4(a) is sparse with respect to the 
standard which Congress intended the federal courts to apply. In South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 121 however, the case which had upheld the ma-
jor features of the Act's special provisions, the Supreme Court had re-
ferred to the bailout mechanism. According to Katzenbach, the bailout 
mechanism did not involve the imposition of an impossible burden of 
115. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
116. Between 1965 and 1980, there were nine successful bailout actions. See TEN YEARS AF-
TER, supra note 5, at 14-15; UNFULFILLED GoALS, supra note 47, at 6 n.27. 
117. See O'Rourke, supra note 92, at 774-75. 
118. 395 u.s. 285 (1969). 
119. /d. at 287. 
120. Gaston County v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 678, 679-80 (D.D.C. 1968) qff'd, 395 U.S. 
285 (1969). 
121. 383 u.s. 301 (1966). 
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proof. 122 The Court referred to the testimony of the Attorney General 
during hearings on the Act, who had stated that a covered jurisdiction 
needed to do no more than (1) submit affidavits from voting officials 
asserting that it has not been guilty of racial discrimination through the 
use of tests or devices for the past five years; and (2) refute other evi-
dence to the contrary that may be adduced by the government. 123 
Both the state code and constitution of North Carolina in effect at 
the time of the passage of the Act contained a requirement that "[e]very 
person presenting himself for registration shall be able to read and 
write any section of the Constitution [ofNorth Carolina] in the English 
language."124 The Attorney General concluded that the requirement 
was a test or device within the meaning of section 4(c) of the Act, and 
that since fewer than 50 percent of the persons of voting age residing in 
Gaston County had voted in the 1964 presidential election, the county 
was designated as a covered jurisdiction subject to the Act's special 
provisions. 125 Whether Gaston County would bail out successfully, 
therefore, was dependent on its ability to show that the literacy test had 
not been administered with a discriminatory purpose or effect for the 
five years preceding the filing of the action, or from August 16, 1961. 
Gaston County presented evidence to show its impartial implementa-
tion of the literacy test during this period, including evidence of the 
appointment of minority deputy registrarsP6 The Attorney General 
presented evidence to refute the claims of Gaston County, including 
evidence tending to show that the test had been administered "for the 
purpose" of abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. 127 
122. Id at 332. 
123. Id; see Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 156 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1965) [hereinater cited as 1965 Senate Hearings]; Voting Rights: Hearings 
on H.R. 6400 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
92-93 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 House Hearings]. 
124. 395 U.S. at 287 n.3 (quoting N.C. CaNST. art. VI, § 4); see also N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 163-58 
(1982) .. 
125. Id at 287. 
126. 288 F. Supp. at 678, 682-83. The county presented evidence showing that in 1962, the 
number of voting precincts had been increased for the convenience of voters, that registration 
books had been kept open for substantial periods and registrars had been encouraged to be avail-
able at any reasonable hour, and that the registration process had received substantial publicity, 
including efforts directed specifically to the black co=unity. Additionally, there was no evi-
dence presented that any registrar had denied registration on racial grounds, nor was there any 
evidence of complaints from black citizens that they had been denied the right to vote. Id 
127. Id at 683-84. For example, the government presented evidence that voting officials had 
waived the literacy test requirement for a number of white voters. Although the waiver policy was 
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The district court, however, found it unnecessary to determine whether 
purposeful discrimination existed in Gaston County during the period; 
instead, the district court concluded that the test was used in the county 
"with the effect" of abridging the right to vote on account of race. 128 
The district court reached this position based on its subsidiary findings 
that during the entire period when persons then of voting age had been 
of school age, the schools in Gaston County had been segregated; that 
the separate educational facilities for blacks had been of appreciably 
inferior quality; and that equal educational opportunities therefore had 
been denied to blacks as a matter of both law and fact in Gaston 
County. 129 The district court concluded that the imposition of any lit-
erary test on blacks as a precondition to voting-let alone one which 
had a "relatively high" standard-must necessarily have had the "effect 
of abridging the right to vote on account of race" in Gaston County. 130 
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly 
had concluded that under section 4(a) "it is appropriate for a court to 
consider whether a literacy or educational requirement has the 'effect 
of denying . . . the right to vote on account of race or color,' " because 
the covered jurisdiction had maintained separate and inferior schools 
for its black residents presently of voting age. 131 The Supreme Court 
interpreted the district court decision as based upon the specific finding 
that the covered jurisdictions not only maintained a system that was 
segregated, but also one that deprived blacks of equal educational op-
portunities (and thus an equal chance to pass the literacy test). 132 
Under the Gaston County holding, covered jurisdictions with dual edu-
cational systems during the applicable period apparently still could ob-
tain bailout by showing that the system had had no "appreciable 
discriminatory effect" on the ability of blacks to meet the literacy 
requirement. 133 
Both the district court and the Supreme Court in Gaston County jus-
tified this interpretation of section 4(a) on the basis ofthe Act's legisla-
not asserted as a discriminatory practice in itself, the government argued that since the waiver 
policy was not made public, black voters were led to believe that they would be required to pass 
the literacy test. Jd 
128. Jd at 684. 
129. ld at 686-88. 
130. Jd at 688-89. 
131. 395 U.S. at 285, 293 (quoting§ 4(a) of the Act). 
132. ld at 291. 
133. Jd 
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tive history. While the relevant legislative history does not deal 
directly with the appropriate method of interpreting the bailout provi-
sion, it is clear that Congress was aware of the potential effect of une-
qual educational opportunities upon the right to vote, and that it 
sought to impose a system that would take into account the inequalities 
that would follow if states were permitted to continue to use literacy 
tests, even those fairly administered, in jurisdictions where disparate 
levels of educational achievement resulted from segregated school 
systems. 134 
Despite the Supreme Court's declaration in Gaston County that the 
mere existence of a segregated system of schools during the period 
when the voting age population was educated wculd not, per se, bar 
bailout, conditions in the other covered jurisdictions in the south were 
such that early bailout did not appear to be probable. This view was 
confirmed by the District of Columbia District Court's 1975 decision in 
Virginia v. United States, 135 the only other reported bailout suit. 
In 1973, Virginia sought early bailout following the adoption of the 
1970 amendments, which had extended from five to ten years the statu-
tory period for which a covered jurisdiction had to show the absence of 
the use of a test or device with a discriminatory purpose or effect in 
order to terminate coverage. Prior to the adoption of the Act, the state 
had utilized a literacy test that was suspended when Virginia became 
covered in 1965.136 Because the state was required to show the absence 
of a discriminatory test or device for a ten-year period prior to filing 
suit, it was required to prove that the literacy test used from 1963 to 
1965 (when the test was suspended) had not been administered with a 
discriminatory purpose or effect. The State submitted survey data from 
voting registrars during the period indicating that the test had not been 
administered in a discriminatory fashion, thus presenting prima facie 
134. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 123, at 22 (testimony of Attorney General Katzenbach). 
See also S. REP. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3, 16 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 SENATE 
REPORT]. 
135. 386 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1974) (per curiam), ajjd, 420 U.S. 901 (1975). 
136. Virginia was among the jurisdictions originally targeted for coverage by the 1965 cover· 
age formula. See supra note 16. The required administrative determinations were made in Au-
gust 7, 1965. 386 F. Supp. at 1320. 
Until 1971, the Virginia Constitution contained a provision (the operation of which was sus-
pended at the time Virginia was covered) requiring that a person wishing to register to vote "make 
application to register in his own handwriting, without aid, suggestion, or memorandum." /d. at 
1320 (quoting VA. CONST. § 20 (1902, repealed 1971)). 
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evidence of lack of discrimination. 137 The district court rejected the 
state's contention on the basis of the same factors utilized in Gaston 
County. The state was shown to have engaged in de jure segregation of 
public schools until1954, and its compliance with the Supreme Court's 
desegregation decisions was found to have been "grudging at best."138 
Evidence was presented by the Attorney General concerning the infer-
ior status of and meager support given to black students and teachers in 
the segregated system, and the generally lower educational achieve-
ment rates for blacks in Virginia. 139 Finally, the state was unable to 
demonstrate that its dual educational system had had no appreciable 
discriminatory effect on the ability of blacks educated under such a 
system to meet the literacy test requirement. 140 
The effect of Gaston County, therefore, was to freeze the status quo 
for the vast majority of covered jurisdictions originally targeted for 
coverage by the Act's special provisions. While an early bailout mech-
anism was provided by the Act, in practice a covered jurisdiction was 
required to wait for a specified number of years (first five, then ten, and 
finally seventeen years) from the date of coverage before termination of 
coverage was possible. Under one view, the bailout mechanism as con-
strued in Gaston County constituted a cruel hoax. Early bailout was 
possible in theory, but impossible in fact for most covered jurisdic-
tions-those that had maintained segregated educational systems. 
Such a view of the bailout process, however, ignores the intent of Con-
gress when it designed the statutory scheme that included the Act's spe-
cial provisions. 
The Supreme Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach 141 stated that 
the Act's special provisions were designed to be operable in those juris-
dictions where there was presented to the Congress reliable and over-
whelming evidence of actual discrimination in voting. 142 Rather than 
deal directly with those jurisdictions, Congress instead adopted a 
formula that identified jurisdictions for coverage by resort to two char-
acteristics thought to be shared in common by those jurisdictions with a 
history of voting discrimination-the use of tests and devices and low 
137. ld at 1325. 
138. Jd at 1323. 
139. Jd at 1323-24. 
140. ld at 1325-26. 
141. 383 u.s. 307 (1966). 
142. Jd at 329. 
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voter turnout. It is true, of course, as the Supreme Court in Katzenbacll 
recognized, that the use of a formula creates a risk of both underinclu-
sion and overinclusion. 143 Jurisdictions guilty of discrimination in vot-
ing might escape coverage while jurisdictions not guilty might be 
included. The first problem was dismissed by the Court as irrelevant 
because the Act was designed to deal with discrimination in voting by 
the misuse of test and devices. While discrimination was possible by 
other means, Congress was not required to deal with all phases of the 
problem in the same way or at the same time. 144 With respect to the 
second objection-that of overbreadth-Congress provided a special 
termination process (early bailout) for jurisdictions covered by the 
formula that had not used tests and devices with a discriminatory pur-
pose or effect for a specified period (initially five years) prior to the 
adoption of the Act. 145 According to the Katzenbacll Court, the bailout 
standard was predicated on the assumption that if voting discrimina-
tion, intentional or effective, had not occurred within the preceding five 
years, there was no need to apply the Act's special provisions (the sus-
pension of the right to use tests and devices and the preclearance man~ 
date).146 The key to the bailout mechanism was, obviously, 
congressional insistence that the burden of proof on the issue whether 
the tests or devices were used with a discriminatory purpose or effect 
rest with the covered jurisdiction. lfthe objection to the Gaston County 
decision was that early bailout was made impossible for most of the 
jurisdictions originally covered, such impossibility was the direct result 
of the selection of an "effects" standard of proof by Congress and the 
congressional mandate that the jurisdiction seeking early termination 
of coverage carry the burden of proof. 
The entire scheme of the original Voting Rights Act, including the 
bailout process, was arbitrary in the sense that unique remedies and 
limited standards for coverage were imposed. 147 Early bailout was 
made possible for those jurisdictions caught by the coverage formula 
for which effective discrimination in voting either was not present or 
was the result of factors other than the use of tests and devices. It was 
not the bailout standard which was unfair (if unfairness inhered in any 
143. Id. at 330-31. 
144. Id. at 331. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. See supra text accompanying notes 14-25. 
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aspect of the Act); it was, instead, the coverage formula, and the con-
gressional desire to eradicate voting discrimination produced by the use 
of tests and devices (as opposed to other means of discrimination) that 
arguably was unfair or unwise. Once Congress had targeted the use of 
tests and devices as the primary evil, and had imposed an effects stan-
dard of proof for early bailout the burden of which had been placed on 
the coverage jurisdiction, the result reached in Gaston County necessar-
ily followed. 
This is not to say that Congress was unable to select an alternative 
method of exempting covered jurisdictions from the Act's special provi-
sions. Clearly, the early bailout standard did not necessarily follow 
from the coverage formula and the remedial measures imposed. Con-
gress might well have utilized a test for early bailout other than one 
which, effectively, was tied to the mere passage of time. Congress 
might well have made termination subject to some affirmative sign of a 
change in attitude or of tangible and positive steps taken to eradicate 
the remaining vestiges of discrimination in voting. It must be recalled 
that the original scheme of the Act both suspended the right to use tests 
and devices and required preclearance for new or different voting prac-
tices and procedures in the covered jurisdictions. Under the original 
version of the Act, termination of coverage would return the right to 
use tests and devices as well as eliminate the preclearance mandate. 148 
Beginning in 1970, the prohibition on the use of test and devices was 
made national in scope, and in 1975, this prohibition became perma-
nent;149 thus, after 1970, bailout no longer would restore the right of 
covered jurisdictions to use tests and devices as a prerequisite to regis-
tration and voting. Mter 1970, the emphasis of the Act as concerns the 
provisions applicable to the covered jurisdictions had shifted to the 
preclearance requirement; there was no longer any concern that termi-
nation of coverage would result in a new round of voting discrimina-
tion through the misuse of test and devices. Accordingly, a new bailout 
standard--one which placed greater emphasis on compliance with the 
preclearance mandate and the remaining features of the Act rather 
than one which focused on the prior misuse of test and devices and the 
fear of further abuse once the right to use them was restored-was war-
ranted. Moreover, linking bailout to the mere passage of time, while 
arguably appropriate when the waiting period was five and ten years, 
148. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 438 (amended 1970). 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 34 & 43. 
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became indefensible and unduly arbitrary once the waiting period had 
reached seventeen years and the debate was over whether to extend it 
for ten more years or even longer. Finally, the original bailout mecha-
nism made no provision for local political subdivisions within a state 
covered in its entirety to seek termination of coverage independently of 
the state.150 While this policy may have been desirable initially, it also 
may have had the effect of providing little incentive for compliance at 
the local level. Some method of providing such incentive was thus 
desirable. 
Representative Hyde's desire to construct a wholly new bailout stan-
dard was, therefore, both appropriate and overdue. The focus of voting 
rights concerns had changed since the adoption of the Act; a whole new 
generation of black voters had emerged as a result of the Act's initial 
remedial measures. Congress responded to the new environment and 
changing concerns with the adoption of the 1982 amendments, includ-
ing the new standard for bailout. The remainder of this Article will be 
devoted to a critical examination of the new bailout standard. 
III. THE REVISED BAILOUT STANDARD: PROCEDURAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
A. General Background 
It is clear that the changes made in the bailout mechanism by the 
1982 amendments are tied closely to the substantive changes made in 
section 2 of the Act; that is, while a change in the bailout mechanism 
was appropriate for its own sake, it is unlikely that it would have oc-
curred absent the pressure generated by the Bolden decision151 and the 
specific problem of allegedly discriminatory electoral systems that were 
unaffected by the 1965 Act. The original Act, it must be recalled, was 
limited in impact in_the following respects. First, section 2 of the Act, 
of general, nationwide applicability, prohibited the abridgment of the 
right to vote on account ofrace or color. 152 Second, section 2 was inter-
preted by Bolden as co-extensive with the reach of the fifteenth amend-
ment, which in tum was interpreted in Bolden as requiring proof that a 
challenged voting practice was conceived or maintained with a discrim-
150. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 167-69 (1980). 
151. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
152. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (amended 1975); see 
supra note 9. 
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inatory purpose or intent. 153 Third, the Act's special provisions were 
limited in geographic scope to areas designated for coverage by the 
coverage formulas, 154 and in such covered jurisdictions the Act merely 
(1) suspended the use of tests and devices (specifically defined) as pre-
requisites to registration and voting; 155 and (2) required preclearance of 
any new or different voting practice or procedure under a purpose or 
effects standard of proof. 156 
In the opinion of many civil rights proponents, a large loophole ex-
isted in the Act. No jurisdiction, even one subject to the Act's special 
provisions, was required to change or eliminate existing voting prac-
tices or procedures, other than those practices which constituted a test 
or device, as defined by the Act, or which violated section 2. While it 
was true that changes in voting practices and procedures in covered 
jurisdictions were subject to the preclearance mandate with its attend-
ant stringent purpose or effects standard of proof, unless the covered 
jurisdiction sought to change its system or unless the system violated 
section 2 (and, a fortiori, the fifteenth amendment), the practices were 
immune from challenge even though they might have a patently dis-
criminatory impact or effect. Litigation aimed at eliminating such 
practices and procedures (whether under the fourteenth and fifteenth 
amendments or under section 2 of the Act), while burdensome since 
case-by-case adjudications were required, did achieve limited suc-
cess, 157 at least until the Bolden decision. One of the major problems 
with the Act, therefore, at least in the view of some, was that it had the 
effect of freezing electoral systems in the covered jurisdictions as they 
existed in 1965. These systems, it was argued, often had a discrimina-
tory effect on minority voters. 
Congress had several options it could have pursued if it had believed 
that certain voting practices, such as the maintenance of at-large meth-
ods of electing officials, constituted an impediment to the achievement 
of truly nondiscriminatory electorial systems. It might have simply 
prohibited the use of at-large systems, whether nationwide or in the 
covered jurisdictions, just as it did with various electoral practices in 
153. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text. 
154. See supra text accompanying notes 16, 33 & 46. 
155. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
156. See supra text accompanying notes 18-24. 
157. See cases cited supra note 69. 
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the nature of tests and devices as defined by the Act. 158 Alternatively, 
it might have amended section 2 of the Act to provide that existing 
electoral practices and procedures would be judged by a purpose or 
effect standard. The latter proposal, however, would suffer from the 
same defect which was present in earlier legislative attempts to deal 
with voting discrimination-the need for case-by-case adjudication. 159 
Finally, Congress might have sought an entirely new method of dealing 
with the problem, one which provided an enticing incentive for juris-
diction with at-large systems to abandon voluntarily their continued 
use. It was Representative Henry Hyde who first proposed a new ap-
proach to bailout, one that would permit covered jurisdictions to termi-
nate coverage upon showing a genuine record of nondiscrimination. 
Although Representative Hyde was dismayed by the bailout standard 
finally adopted, it was he who first introduced the idea that the Act 
should allow for a "good conduct ribbon" for those jurisdictions that 
had "cleaned up their act,"160 and should provide some "incentives for 
jurisdictions to continue to respect the constitutional right to vote by all 
of our citizens."161 Although the new bailout standard is not free from 
ambiguity, the most reasonable interpretation of the new system will 
include a requirement that covered jurisdictions have voluntarily aban-
doned electoral systems, such as multimember districts, that have dis-
criminatory effects. 162 While section 2 has been amended to prohibit 
158. The Supreme Court's decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), 
recognized that Congress intentionally chose to limit the impact of the Act to those jurisdictions 
where there was evidence of discrimination through the use of tests and devices, as statutorily 
defined. When passing on the constitutionality of the Act, the Court noted that it was irrelevant 
that the coverage formula excluded jurisdictions not employing tests and devices, but for which 
there was evidence of voting discrimination by other means. Id at 330-31. 
159. One of the principal objectives of the Act was to eliminate the need for case-by-case 
adjudication of voting discrimination claims. South Carolina v. Katzen bach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 
(1966). See also 1965 SENATE REPORT, supra note 123, at pt. 3, 6-9; 1965 HOUSE REPORT, supra 
note 8, at 9-11. 
Prior to the 1980 decision in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980), there was some 
doubt whether Congress possessed the legislative power under § 2 of the fifteenth amendment to 
prohibit electoral practices having only discriminatory effects. City of Rome, however, held that 
under § 2, Congress may prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not violate § 1 of the 
amendment (that is, practices which do not constitute purposeful discrimination), and at least in 
certain cases, may prohibit practices that are discriminatory only in their effect. Id at 173-76. 
160. 1981 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 1822. 
161. Id Representative Hyde recognized, however, that the incentive aspects of the revised 
bailout system were highly theoretical. Id 
162. The new bailout system includes a provision that requires covered jurisdictions to elimi-
nate ''voting procedures and methods of election which inhibit or dilute equal access to the e1ecto-
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the maintenance of electoral systems having a discriminatory impact or 
effect, the burden of proof of showing a violation of section 2 still rests 
with the party challenging the system. 163 It is likely, therefore, that 
some or even most challenges to multimember districts will fail. 
Bailout, on the other hand, requires the covered jurisdiction to carry 
the burden of proof on all issues, 164 including the requirement that it 
has eliminated all voting procedures and methods of election that in-
hibit or dilute equal access to the electoral process. Thus, it can be seen 
that the bailout criteria are inextricably linked to congressional efforts 
to eliminate the loophole that existed under the original version of the 
Act, whereby covered jurisdictions were permitted to maintain electo-
ral practices in effect in 1965 which had a discriminatory effect on mi-
nority voters. 
The criteria for termination of coverage under the 1982 amendments, 
however, include more than the requirement that the covered jurisdic-
tions abandon electoral systems thought to dilute minority participa-
tion in the electoral process. There are numerous additional 
requirements that must be met, most of which relate to the covered 
jurisdiction's record of compliance with the Act's special provisions. 
Because the new bailout mechanism will place a new and heavy burden 
on the Department of Justice, the effective date of the new bailout pro-
cess has been deferred until August 6, 1984, in order to allow the De-
partment to develop standards and regulations for the new system. 165 
ral process." Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(4)(F)(i), 96 Stat. 
131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(4)(F)(i) (1982)). See iifra text accompanying notes 294-321. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee described the purpose of this requirement as follows: 
In determining whether procedures or methods inhibit or dilute equal access to the elec-
toral process the standard to be used is the results tests. . . . In other words, the test 
would be the same as that for a challenge brought under Section 2 . . • as amended . . . 
except that the burden of proof would be on the jurisdiction seeking to bail out. 
1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 54. 
163. See, e.g., United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 548 F. Supp. 875, 915 (S.D. Ala. 
1982). 
164. There is no explicit burden of proof allocation in the 1982 amendments. The Supreme 
Court, however, when construing the original bailout provision, allocated the burden of proof to 
the covered jurisdiction. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 332 (1966). The Senate 
Judiciary Committee Report strongly supports this interpretation of the 1982 amendments. See 
1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 56, 69; 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 39;seea/so 
infra text accompanying notes 181-83. 
165. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2{b), 96 Stat. 131. 
According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the delay "is essential for the Department of 
Justice to prepare for the heavy load of litigation under the new standards" and "will permit the 
Department, the covered jurisdictions, and local civil rights groups to review the law and to pre-
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Prior to the effective date of the new bailout mechanism, the previous 
bailout criteria remain in effect; that is, the Act was amended to extend 
from seventeen to nineteen years the period of time a covered jurisdic-
tion is required to show that no test or device has been used with a 
discriminatory purpose or effect. 166 
B. Procedural and Evidentiary Requirements 
1. Venue 
Bailout under the 1982 amendments continues to be a process requir-
ingjudicia1 approval through the declaratory judgment process. More-
over, Congress has retained the provision in the original Act that 
jurisdiction to hear bailout suits is limited to a three-judge panel of the 
District Court for the District of Columbia. 167 The bailout provision 
originally proposed by Representatives Hyde and Lungren would have 
permitted any "appropriate" federal district court to hear bailout re-
quests. 168 Although Representatives Hyde and Lungren later agreed to 
an amendment to limit jurisdiction to the District of Columbia District 
Court, 169 the retention of the limited venue requirement drew substan-
tial opposition from other members of Congress. 
The justification for the limited venue provision in the 1982 amend-
ments was identical to that advanced in 1965 when limited venue was 
provided for both bailout and the judicial aspect of preclearance: the 
desirability of the development of judicial expertise to hear and resolve 
the complex issues presented under the Act and the need for uniform 
interpretation of the Act's provisions. 170 It was the opinion of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee that the justifications for the retention of the 
limited venue provision were even more compelling under the 1982 
amendments since the new bailout criteria are more complex than they 
pare for proceedings." 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 59; see also 1981 HoUSE REPORT, 
supra note 76, at 39. 
166. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(a), 96 Stat. 131 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1982)). 
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1976). 
168. The original proposal of Representatives Hyde and Lungren to modify the bailout sys-
tem, H.R. 3948, may be found at 1981 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 1856-61. 
169. See 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 55 (supplemental views of Reps. Hyde and 
Lungren). 
170. See 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 58-59; 1981 HoUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 
36. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331 (1966), the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the original version of the Act limiting jurisdiction to hear bailout requests to a 
single court in the District of Columbia. 
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were under the bailout mechanism of the original Act. 171 Finally, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee noted the historic problem in voting rights 
litigation when relief was sought in "local district courts." The Com-
mittee's report recognizes that while the difficulty in obtaining relief 
may have abated somewhat in recent years, the problem still exists. 172 
The criticisms of the limited venue provision were familiar. Senator 
East described the provision as "an abuse of that power that is contrary 
to the basic principles ofjustice." 173 Both Senator East and Representa-
tive Butler objected to the added costs associated with limited venue: 
the added expense and impracticability of bringing witnesses from the 
locality to Washington to testify and the need to retain Washington 
counsel who would be familiar with litigation in the District of Colum-
bia. 174 Both also condemned the implicit conclusion that Congress 
could not trust the local district courts to enforce the Act fairly. 175 
Congressman Butler, however, identified two additional major 
problems with the limited venue provision that may prove troublesome 
and which were not present under the original bailout mechanism. 
First, he correctly noted that the new bailout standard will require nu-
merous and explicit findings of fact that will be made more difficult by 
vesting jurisdiction in a court far removed from the unique circum-
stances which may have shaped the electoral affairs of the jurisdiction 
seeking bailout. 176 Bailout under the original Act was relatively simple 
and the findings of fact required were not especially complex. 177 The 
bailout criteria under the 1982 amendments, as will be demonstrated 
later, 178 are dependent upon findings of fact with respect to some 
highly ambiguous standards. The second problem identified by Con-
171. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 58. 
172. /d The Committee identified the Mississippi reapportionment litigation that lasted 14 
years as an example of a case where local federal courts were reluctant to provide appropriate 
relief. /d at 58-59. The procedural history of this extraordinary case is contained in Connor v. 
Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 411-13 (1977). 
173. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 220 (minority views of Sen. East). 
174. /d; 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 66-67 (dissenting view of Rep. Butler). 
175. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 220 (minority views of Sen. East); 1981 HousE 
REPORT, supra note 76, at 66-67 (dissenting views of Rep. Butler). 
176. See 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 66 (dissenting views of Rep. Butler). 
177. The bailout standard under the 1975 version of the Act was whether the covered jurisdic-
tion had used a test or device during the preceding seventeen years. See supra text accompanying 
note 42. 
178. See infta notes 214-344 and accompanying text. 
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gressman Butler179 could prove even more troublesome. Under the 
original Act, political subdivisions within states covered in their en-
tirety could not bail out independently of the state. This limitation was 
removed by the 1982 amendments. 180 At least until the new bailout 
criteria are interpreted by the courts and more specific standards are set 
by judicial interpretation, large numbers of bailout suits are likely to be 
filed. A single court may lack the capacity to hear the cases within a 
reasonable period of time. As a result, a significant backlog of cases 
may develop, thus frustrating the intent of Congress to permit localities 
with good records of compliance to obtain early termination. 
2 Burden of Proof 
In addition to the retention of limited venue for bailout suits, Con-
gress has retained the requirement that a jurisdiction seeking bailout 
carry the burden of proving that the criteria for bailout have been 
met.181 Recall that the Gaston County decision under the Act's original 
bailout standard turned largely on the inability of the jurisdictions to 
establish that segregated school systems did not have an "appreciable 
discriminatory effect" on the ability of black voters to meet literacy re-
quirements. 182 The locus of the burden of proof, therefore, played an 
important role under the original Act in making bailout difficult, if not 
impossible, for most covered jurisdictions. 
The new bailout mechanism, which involves more numerous and 
ambiguous standards, undoubtedly will make bailout more difficult be-
cause of the requirement that the covered jurisdiction carry the burden 
of proof. The Senate Judiciary Committee's report, moreover, made it 
clear that this burden must be met by objective and factual evidence 
and cannot be satisfied by mere "assertions and conclusory 
declarations." 183 
179. 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 67 (dissenting views of Rep. Butler). 
180. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(2), 96 Stat. 131 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(2) (1982)); see also i'!fra text accompanying notes 197-213. 
181. See supra note 164. 
182. 395 U.S. 285 (1969); see supra text accompanying note 133. 
183. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 56. The Senate Judiciary Committee asserted 
that "protestations of good faith administration of voting procedures, or declarations that local 
practices are nondiscriminatory would not, standing alone, be enough to meet the jurisdiction's 
burden of proof." Id at n.187. 
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3. Evidentiary Requirements 
The locus of the burden of proof is not the only procedural proof 
problem presented by the 1982 amendments. The covered jurisdiction 
seeking to bail out is required to present evidence of minority partici-
pation in the electoral process to aid the court in determining whether 
to grant the bailout request. 184 The evidence that must be presented by 
the covered jurisdiction includes data on the levels of minority group 
registration and voting, changes in such levels over time, and dispari-
ties between minority group and non-minority group participation. 185 
The House Judiciary Committee Report asserted that evidence of par-
ticipation levels should include election results because such results are 
often "sound indicators" of whether minorities have a fair opportunity 
in the elective process. 186 
While this requirement is stated in terms of an evidentiary burden 
rather than a bailout criterion, both the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committee Reports suggested that evidence of low minority participa-
tion in the voting process should preclude bailout. 187 The Senate Com-
mittee Report stated that a "low level of [minority] participation is 
central to the formula that triggers section 5 coverage" and that such 
evidence "is one reliable indicator of whether section 5 is still 
needed." 188 The House Judiciary Committee Report stated that it 
would be "anomalous to terminate coverage where continued de-
pressed levels of minority participation show that voting discrimination 
is still a problem."189 This reading of the statute-that evidence oflow 
minority participation in the electoral process, standing alone, will bar 
bailout-appears to be contrary to the statutory framework of the 1982 
amendments. This evidentiary burden is prefaced by the statement 
that the information is needed "[t]o assist the court in determining 
whether to issue a declaratory judgment,"190 and what is required is 
evidence of minority participation both on absolute levels and in com-
parison with participation levels for non-minority voters. The statutory 
184. Voting Right Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(a)(2), 96 Stat. 132 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(2) (1982)). 
185. /d. 
186. 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 44. 
187. See 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 55; 1981 HousE REPoRT, supra note 76, at 
44. 
188. See 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 55. 
189. 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 44. 
190. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). 
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language does not state or even imply that low or disparate levels of 
participation, standing alone, will preclude bailout, and the Senate Ju-
diciary Report acknowledged that the bailout requirements do not 
mandate a specific level of minority participation. 191 As will be 
demonstrated in the next section dealing with the substantive bailout 
criteria, one bailout requirement mandates that covered jurisdictions 
make constructive efforts to increase minority participation in the elec-
toral process. 192 While it is clear that some evidence of the efficacy of 
such efforts would be relevant, even this specific requirement does not 
provide that low or disparate levels of participation will preclude 
bailout. 
4. Publicity and Intervention 
The final procedural requirement of the bailout process is the man-
date that a state or political subdivision seeking to bail out publicize the 
intended commencement of its declaratory judgment action in the me-
dia serving such state or political subdivision and in appropriate 
United States post offices. 193 In addition, similar publicity must be 
given in the event of any proposed settlement. 194 Finally, the 1982 
amendments provide that any "aggrieved party" may intervene at any 
stage in the declaratory judgment action. 195 The House Judiciary 
Committee Report states that an aggrieved party should be construed 
to include "any person who would have standing under law." 196 
C Local Bailout and the ·~11 or Nothing" Requirement 
One of the most significant changes made by the 1982 amendments is 
the authorization for political subdivisions to obtain bailout even 
though the state as a whole is covered by the Act's special provisions 
and is not eligible for bailout. 197 The new bailout mechanism, in this 
respect, is a consequence not only of a change in the philosophy of 
191. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 56. 
192. See infra text accompanying notes 336-44. 
193. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(2), 96 Stat. 132-33 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (1982)). 
194. Id. 
195. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(9), 96 Stat. 133 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(9) (1982)). 
196. 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 45. 
197. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b), 96 Stat. 131 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (1982)). 
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bailout, as evidenced by the new criteria, but also of the method by 
which Congress constructed the coverage formula and of the judicial 
interpretation given the Act's special provisions, including the 
preclearance mandate. 
Recall that the coverage formula of section 4 conceived by Congress 
for the Act's special provisions permitted coverage on two levels. If a 
state as a whole met the coverage formula, coverage was statewide;198 
in the event the state as a whole was not covered, political subdivisons 
within the state could be independently covered. 199 The term "political 
subdivision" was defined in section 14(c)(2)200 to include "any county 
or parish except where registration for voting is not conducted under 
the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other 
subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting." 
The coverage formula, therefore, in a sense was limited in scope 
(only states or political subdivisions, as specifically defined, could be 
covered), but it did result in the coverage of numerous political subdi-
visions in states not otherwise subject to the Act's special provisions.2°1 
Bailout under section 4(a) of the Act was linked to the coverage 
formula; that is, bailout suits could be brought only by a state if the 
state was covered in its entirety, or by a political subdivision, as defined 
in section 14(c)(2), if the political subdivision was one for which cover-
age determination was made as a separate unit. 202 The legislative his-
tory of section 4 is unambiguous in the sense that bailout was to be 
limited with reference to the coverage formula; political subdivisions 
within a state covered in its entirety could not obtain bailout even 
though when considered as a separate unit it might have met the 
bailout standard, nor could any other political unit of government 
within a covered jurisdiction, state, or political subdivision, obtain 
bailout independently of the covered jurisdiction.2°3 
While section 4 and the legislative history may have been unambigu-
198. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; see also supra note 15. 
199. /d. 
200. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 14, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1973(c)(2) (1982)). 
201. See supra notes 16, 33 & 34. 
202. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 438 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (1982)); see City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 162-69 (1980). 
203. See 1965 SENATE REPORT, supra note 154, at 3, 16; 1965 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, 
at 14. The House Report stated: 
This opportunity to obtain exemption is afforded only to those States or to those subdivi-
sions as to which the [coverage] formula has been determined to apply as a separate unit; 
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ous, judicial interpretations of other features of the Act complicated the 
bailout process and undoubtedly contributed to the shape of the bailout 
mechanism as modified by the 1982 amendments. In what may have 
constituted the most significant case interpreting the Act, United States 
v. Board of Commissioners ,204 the Supreme Court held that for pur-
poses of the section 5 preclearance mandate, which requires 
preclearance by any covered "state" or "political subdivision," the 
terms "state" or "political subdivision" were intended in a "territorial" 
or "geographic" sense;205 any political unit of government within a cov-
ered state or political subdivision that possessed the authority to change 
a ''voting practice or procedure" was required to preclear proposed 
changes. Thus, the term "state" or "political subdivision" under the 
Act was defined differently depending on the section of the Act being 
construed. For purposes of both coverage and bailout, the term "polit-
ical subdivision" meant any county or parish except when registration 
and voting were conducted by independent cities. If a political subdivi-
sion, as so defined, was covered because the entire state was covered, 
separate bailout was not permitted; if, however, the political subdivi-
sion was one for which independent coverage had been mandated, then 
it could obtain bailout on its own. For purposes of section 5 
preclearance, on the other hand, the terms "state" or "political subdivi-
sion" included any political unit of government within a covered state 
or independently covered political subdivision which possessed the au-
thority to promulgate (and proposed to do so) any new ''voting qualifi-
cation or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice or procedure with 
respect to voting." 
Id 
While this construction of the Act may have strained credulity206 and 
subdivisions within a State which is covered by the formula are not afforded the oppor-
tunity for separate exemption. 
204. 435 u.s. 110 (1978). 
205. Id at 120, 126. Sheffield, Alabama, a city that did not conduct voter registration, was 
therefore required to obtain preclearance of changes in its registration and voting practices and 
procedures because it was geographically within the state of Alabama, a covered State. I d. at 124-
29. See also Board ofEduc. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 43-47 (1978) (holding that independent school 
board within covered state was required to obtain preclearance of rule requiring its employees to 
take unpaid leave-of-absence when running for public office). 
206. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 198 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The 
court thus construes the identical words in § 4(a) to have one meaning in one situation and a 
wholly different sense when applied in another context. Such a protean construction reduces the 
statute to irrationality."). 
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led to the anomalous result that a political unit of government had to 
comply with section 5 but could not obtain bailout even though, stand-
ing alone, it met the bailout criteria, the consequences under the origi-
nal bailout mechanism were consistent with congressional intent. 
Under the new bailout mechanism, the situation is entirely different. 
Congress specifically has authorized bailout by a "political subdivi-
sion" (as defined for coverage purposes) within a state covered in its 
entirety (as the political subdivision existed on the date such determi-
nations were made with respect to the state)207 even though no separate 
coverage determinations were made with respect to such subdivision 
"as a separate unit." The bailout criteria, however, provide with re-
spect to several requirements that not only must the jurisdiction seek-
ing termination of coverage meet the criteria, but "all governmental 
units within its territory" likewise must have met the requirements.208 
One of the bailout requirements is that the covered jurisdiction (and all 
governmental units within) have complied with the section 5 
preclearance mandate. 209 
This facet of the new bailout mechanism appropriately might be la-
beled an "all or nothing" approach. In order for a state to terminate 
coverage, for example, it would have to demonstrate that it and each 
governmental unit within it had satisfied all bailout requirements. The 
failure of any governmental unit within a state to meet the require-
ments, such as the timely submission for preclearance of a proposed 
change in voting practices and procedures, would preclude the state 
from bailing out. This linkage undoubtedly will contribute to a multi-
plicity of bailout suits by political subdivisions, because the failure of 
even one local government to meet the criteria will bar the entire state 
207. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(2), 96 Stat. 131 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(l) (1982)). 
208. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(4)(F), 96 Stat. 132 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(l)(F) (1982)). 
209. ld at§ 2(b)(4}(D), 96 Stat. 132 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(l)(D) (1982)). 
The Senate Judiciary Committee asserted that, despite this all or nothing approach to bailout, 
fully 25% of the political subdivisions within the seven southern states covered in their entirety by 
the 1965 coverage formula will be able to bail out beginning in 1984. See 1982 SENATE REPORT, 
supra note 77, at 60. The 25% figure was obtained from information supplied by the Joint Center 
for Political Studies. See 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 823-28, 830-32, 1664, 1827-44. 
For an analysis of the projections, see O'Rourke, supra note 92, at 791 n.l30. 
Assistant Attorney General Reynolds testified, however, that according to Department of Jus-
tice assessments, "very few, if any, jurisdictions .•. would be able to bail out ... for a considera-
ble period of time." 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 1707. 
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qua state, but will not necessarily bar bailout by all other political sub-
divisions within a state. Should a political subdivision attempt to bail 
out, it also would have to assume responsibility for all governmental 
units within its territory.210 
The theory of "all or nothing" bailout is, of course, that the "greater" 
jurisdiction has responsibility for the conduct of the "lesser" units 
within. In the case of state government, such a theory may be justified. 
State governments do have significant statutory and practical control 
over the activities of local governments,211 and historically have been 
treated as the units of government responsible for protecting the right 
to vote.212 Thus, conditioning bailout for an entire state on activity at 
the local level is arguably both theoretically sound and practically justi-
fied. Very little consideration, however, appears to have been given to 
the "all or nothing" approach to bailout for political subdivisions.213 
While the state properly may be held accountable for the activities of 
its local governmental units, it is quite another matter for the Act to 
require a county government seeking bailout to assume responsibility 
for the activities of, for example, an independent school board within 
its geographic (but not political) territory. This aspect of bailout un-
doubtedly will contribute to the view that while the bailout rules have 
been liberalized in theory (by extending bailout to political subdivi-
sions within a state covered in its entirety), the conditions for termina-
tion of coverage have been made so restrictive that bailout will 
continue to be impossible for most jurisdictions. 
210. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(l)(D) (1976). 
211. The Senate Judiciary Co=ittee noted that except for South Carolina and Texas, the 
covered states do not have "home rule,'' in the sense that counties are empowered to perform 
legislative functions concerning their activities. Even in those states with some form of "home 
rule,'' the interaction between state laws and local laws is complex and the activities of local 
governments often are preempted by state law or authorized by state legislative action. 1982 SEN-
ATE REPORT, .supra note 77, at 57. 
212. Id. at 56-57. The Senate Judiciary Co=ittee asserted that the fifteenth amendment 
places on the states the responsibility of protecting voting rights, and that the states have broad 
power to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised. /d. 
213. Neither the House nor the Senate Judiciary Co=ittee report addresses the rationale for 
subjecting political subdivisions to the all or nothing approach. The House report simply asserts 
that "because jurisdictions may bail out together, the co=ittee believes that they should all sat-
isfy the bailout requirements." 1981 HousE REPORT, .supra note 76, at 41. 
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IV. THE REVISED BAILOUT STANDARD: SUBSTANTIVE 
REQUIREMENTS 
43 
The substantive requirements for bailout can be divided into two 
separate categories. One set of requirements is designed to monitor 
compliance with the specific mandates of the Act for the ten-year pe-
riod preceding the filing of the bailout suit (hereinafter the "specific 
compliance component"). The second set of criteria is more general 
and is designed to require covered jurisdictions to take affirmative steps 
beyond those otherwise mandated by the Act to eliminate the last ves-
tiges of voting discrimination (hereinafter the "affirmative action 
component"). 
A. The Spec!fic Compliance Component 
The specific compliance component of the Act that must be demon-
strated for a ten-year period prior to the filing of the suit for bailout 
contains three separate elements. First, the jurisdiction (including all 
governmental units within) must show that it has not lost in voting 
rights litigation; that it has not entered into certain kinds of consent 
decrees, settlements or agreements; and that it has no actions pending 
against it for voting rights violations. Second, it must show that no 
federal examiners have been sent into the jurisdiction by the Attorney 
General pursuant to the authority conferred by section 6 of the Act. 
Third, it must show that it and all governmental units within its terri-
tory have complied with the preclearance requirements of the Act. 
1. Final Judgments, Consent Decrees~ Settlements, and Pending 
Litigation 
Under the original bailout mechanism, in addition to the require-
ment that the covered jurisdiction show that it had used no test or de-
vice for the requisite time period, a state or political subdivision was 
prohibited from bailing out if a final judgment had been entered 
against it in which it was found to have denied or abridged the right to 
vote on account of race or color through the use of tests or devices (or 
in the case of jurisdictions covered by the 1972 coverage formula be-
cause of language minority provisions, that no final judgment had been 
entered against it in which it was found to have acted contrary to the 
specific minority language requirements).214 The "no final judgment" 
214. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1976) (amended 1982). 
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aspect of the bailout test has been retained in the 1982 amendments, 
but the nature of the final judgment that will bar bailout has been 
changed. Any judgment of discrimination in voting will bar bailout, 
regardless of the nature of the discrimination;215 there is no longer a 
requirement that the discrimination be through the use of a test or de-
vice. According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, this requirement 
was added because of the belief that the judgment constitutes persua-
sive evidence that the covered jurisdiction has not "abided by the prin-
ciples" upon which the Act was grounded and has not acted in "good 
faith."216 In testimony given before the Senate Judiciary Committee, it 
was noted that as of August, 1984 (the effective date of the new bailout 
standard), at least seventeen jurisdictions will be precluded from 
bailout solely as a result of this requirement.217 For purposes of this 
requirement, "final judgment" means a final decision of any court; in-
terlocutory judgments or orders are not included, but a final decision of 
a district court will constitute a "final judgment" even though an ap-
peal might be pending.218 
The "consent decree" ban also is new. Under this provision, bailout 
will be denied if the jurisdiction has entered into a "consent decree, 
settlement, or agreement . . . resulting in any abandonment of a voting 
practice" challenged on the grounds that it abridged or denied the right 
to vote on account of race or color or in contravention of the special 
language minority provisions.219 
The "no consent decree" requirement engendered substantial oppo-
sition and is likely to cause numerous interpretative problems. Some 
members of Congress argued that to bar bailout solely because the ju-
risdiction has entered into a consent decree will encourage prolonged 
litigation and discourage public officials from resolving disputed voting 
practices through voluntary conciliation.220 Recall, however, that a 
consent decree will bar bailout only when it includes the abandonment 
215. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(4)(B), 96 Stat. 131 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(B) (1982)). 
216. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 50. 
217. 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 1704 (statement of Assistant Attorney General 
Reynolds). The Assistant Attorney General added, however, that he did not consider the provi-
sion to impose an "onerous requirement." Id 
218. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 70. 
219. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(4)(B), 96 Stat. 131 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(I)(B) (1982)). 
220. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 161-62; 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 67 
(dissenting views of Rep. Butler). 
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of the challenged practice. Construed literally, the limitation would 
cover even a slight modification in the challenged practice negotiated 
through the consent decree process since the practice would be "aban-
doned," albeit in the form of a new, slightly modified, practice. A more 
reasonable interpretation of the term would be that the jurisdiction 
must have agreed to abandon the "essence" or "fundamental principle" 
of the challenged practice. 
The justification for inclusion of the requirement is set out in the 
Senate Judiciary Committee Report. The committee noted that it is 
unlikely that a covered jurisdiction would agree to a major change in 
its electoral system simply to avoid the nuisance of a suit unless the 
practice was thought to be vulnerable to a legal challenge.221 If the 
practice is legally vulnerable-subject to challenge under section 2 of 
the Act, for instance-it is difficult to argue that a settlement which 
results in its abandonment in principle or in its fundamental aspects 
should be treated differently from a final judgment finding the practice 
to be discriminatory. An amendment on the House floor to limit the 
consent decree prohibition to those decrees that the bailout court found 
to have involved a practice reflecting underlying discrimination was de-
feated because it was thought to be impracticable.222 
The new provision, however, covers more than consent decrees re-
sulting in the abandonment of a voting practice. Also included are 
"settlements" or "agreements" to abandon practices "challenged" on 
the specified grounds. As Representative Butler argued in his minority 
report, it is unclear whether this prohibition refers only to "agree-
ments" or "settlements" reached between litigants in a formal judicial 
proceeding, and whether the word "challenged" constitutes an opera-
tive limitation.223 Would a citizen's oral complaint voiced to local gov-
ernment officials objecting to the location of a polling place constitute 
the type of challenge that would bar bailout if the officials agreed to 
change the location in response to the complaint, even though the citi-
zen might not have articulated specifically the view that the practice 
constituted "discrimination" on the basis of race or color or was in vio-
lation of the language minority provisions of the Act? On the one 
hand, a broad interpretation of these terms simply will fuel further the 
221. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 50; see also 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, 
at 40 ("traditionally consent decrees are treated as the functional equivalent of final judgments"). 
222. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 51. 
223. 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 67 (dissenting views of Rep. Butler). 
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argument that the provision discourages settlement and is thus contrary 
to public policy. A broad interpretation will preclude bailout when a 
challenged practice has been ended by agreement prior to institution of 
litigation, and not just when such a practice has been withdrawn before 
the expense of trial. Moreover, a broad interpretation will present diffi-
cult problems of proof, especially when it is recalled that the covered 
jurisdiction must show the absence of proscribed action for a ten-year 
period and must carry the burden of proof on all issues. On the other 
hand, to limit interpretation of the provision to formal settlements of 
judicial proceedings of record might frustrate congressional intent by 
allowing bailout to tum on the seemingly irrelevant fact whether the 
complainant first sought informal relief or, instead, filed suit or a com-
plaint with the Department of Justice before opening discussions re-
garding possible settlement. The most reasonable interpretation of the 
provision, therefore, would be that bailout would be precluded by the 
abandonment of a voting practice or procedure when the jurisdiction is 
unable to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the abandon-
ment of a voting practice or procedure did not occur because (1) some 
citizen or organization had made a reasonably specific objection to the 
voting practice or procedure later abandoned; (2) which objection was 
based on the ground that the practice or procedure was discriminatory 
on the basis of race or color or on the ground that it was in contraven-
tion of the Act's special language minority provisions; (3) which objec-
tion was communicated to officials responsible for the practice or 
procedure; and (4) which objection or complaint was proximately re-
lated in time to the abandonment of the practice or procedure. 
The final requirement of this element of the specific compliance 
component is perhaps the most controversial. Bailout is precluded dur-
ing the "pendency of an action commenced before the filing of an ac-
tion [for bailout] . . . alleging such denials or abridgments of the right 
to vote."224 The House Judiciary Committee Report argued that the 
"interests of judicial economy dictate that pending suits alleging deni-
als of voting rights be adjudicated before bailout is permitted."225 The 
Senate Judiciary Committee Report states that a pending suit raises 
"substantial questions" about whether a jurisdiction is in full compli-
ance, and since the purpose of bailout is to permit covered jurisdictions 
224. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(4)(B), 96 Stat. 132 
{codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(B) (1982)). 
225. 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 40. 
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with a "clean slate" and "history of compliance" to exempt themselves 
from coverage, to allow bailout when it might be found soon thereafter 
that the jurisdiction was guilty of discrimination would be 
unacceptable.226 
There are both interpretive and practical problems with this require-
ment. The provision was amended on the House floor to make it clear 
that complaints filed after the bailout suit has commenced will not 
count as pending suits for purposes of preventing bailout.227 It is un-
clear, however, whether the prohibition covers suits filed prior to the 
bailout suit and which are still pending on appeal. Presumably, an ac-
tion will be interpreted as pending until such time as final judgment 
has been entered and all appeals have been exhausted or the time for 
appeal of a final judgment has passed. This interpretation is supported 
indirectly by the statement in the Senate Judiciary Committee Report 
that existing expeditious methods of dealing with appeals will negate 
the potential for substantial delay.228 
The potential for delay of the bailout determination during the pen-
dency of a suit alleging discrimination is significant, unless (as propo-
nents of the provision argued) existing procedural devices ensure 
prompt disposition of frivolous or insubstantial complaints and ap-
peals. The Senate Judiciary Committee expressed the view that provi-
sions for the assessment of costs, including attorneys' fees, against 
parties filing frivolous complaints constitute a substantial safeguard, 
and that the procedural devices of summary dismissal, summary judg-
ment, and expedited appeals confer additional protection against 
abuses.229 
2. Federal Examiners 
The second major aspect of the specific compliance component re-
quires the covered jurisdiction to show that for the ten-year period pre-
ceding the bailout suit "no federal examiners under [the] Act have been 
226. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 51. According to the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, the nsk of allowing a jurisdiction to bail out when it may be found soon thereafter to have 
discriminated outweighs the "mere delay" in obtaining the bailout judgment. ld 
227. 127 CONG. REc. H6939, H6945 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1981) (amendment offered by Rep. 
Edwards). 
228. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 51 n.I78. Representative Butler also interpreted 
the provision as barring bailout during the pendency of an appeal. 1981 HousE REPORT, supra 
note 76, at 68 (dissenting views of Rep. Butler). 
229. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 51 n.178. 
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assigned" to the jurisdiction.230 Section 6 of the Act, which is one of 
the special provisions applicable only to covered jurisdictions, permits 
the appointment of federal examiners upon the certification of the At-
torney GeneraF31 The Attorney General may authorize the appoint-
ment of examiners upon receipt of twenty "meritorious" written 
complaints from citizens in the covered jurisdiction claiming that their 
right to vote has been denied or abridged on account of race or color or 
contrary to the Act's language minority provisions, or if the Attorney 
General believes the examiners are necessary to enforce the guarantees 
of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment.232 The duties of federal ex-
aminers include interviewing and listing people eligible to vote and be-
ing available during an election and within forty-eight hours after the 
polls close to receive complaints that qualified voters have been denied 
the right to vote.233 
In connection with the designation of a covered jurisdiction for the 
appointment of federal examiners, the Attorney General may also ap-
point federal observers.234 Federal observers, who traditionally work 
with attorneys from the Department of Justice, are assigned to polling 
places for the purpose of observing whether persons entitled to vote are 
being permitted to vote and whether the votes cast are being properly 
counted.235 The designation of a jurisdiction for the appointment of 
federal examiners under section 6, therefore, can be both for the pur-
pose of conducting registration and for the purpose of establishing a 
federal presence (in the person of the examiner as well as the observer) 
to monitor the conduct of an election and to receive complaints. 
In recent years, the Department of Justice has made very few desig-
nations for the purpose of listing eligible voters. From the adoption of 
the Act through December 31, 1981, 110 counties (some of which also 
are included in the count for the appointment of federal observers) 
were designated for the appointment of examiners for the purpose of 
listing eligible voters or receiving complaints, but most such designa-
230. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(4)(C), 96 Stat. 131 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(C) (1982)). 
231. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 6, 79 Stat. 439 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1973d (1976)). The selection and appointment of examiners is handled by the Office 
of Personnel Management. Id 
232. Id 
233. Id; see also UNFULFILLED GoALS, supra note 47, at 9. 
234. 42 u.s.c. § 1973f (1982). 
235. UNFULFILLED GoALS, supra note 47, at 9-10. 
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tions occurred prior to 1975.236 The designation for the purpose of 
appointing federal observers, on the other hand, continues to be regu-
larly employed. From 1975 through 1980, 74 political subdivisions 
were designated for the appointment of federal examiners as precursors 
for the appointment of federal observers.237 
There are, therefore, substantial numbers of political subdivisions 
that have been designated by the Attorney General for the appoint-
ment of federal examiners. Once a jurisdiction has been listed, the 
designation continues until such time as the Attorney General or the 
District Court for the District of Columbia in a declaratory judgment 
action determines that more than fifty percent of the nonwhite persons 
of voting age are registered to vote; that all persons listed for registra-
tion by federal examiners have been placed on the registration rolls; 
and that there is no longer any reason to believe that persons will be 
deprived of their right to vote on account of race or color or in contra-
vention of the Act's minority language guarantees.238 
Objection to the "no federal examiners" requirement was based pri-
marily upon the argument that the Attorney General's decision to des-
ignate a jurisdiction for examiners is not subject to judicial review.239 
According to Senator East, a future Attorney General might designate 
examiners merely to prevent a covered jurisdiction from escaping the 
Act's special provisions through the bailout process.240 While it is true 
that the Attorney General's decision to designate an area for the ap-
pointment of examiners is a purely administrative action not subject to 
judicial review, the Act did set standards for the appointment.241 The 
Supreme Court upheld the provision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
finding that the statute protected against arbitrary use of the appoint-
ment process.242 Moreover, in connection with the designation of a ju-
risdiction for the appointment of examiners for the purpose of sending 
236. 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 1806-08 (attachment K to statement of Assistant 
Attorney General Reynolds). There have been only 35 such designations since 1975, and 11 of 
these were in the state of Texas, which was not covered in its entirety untill975. /d. 
237. See UNFULFILLED GoALS, supra note 47, at lO;seea/so 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 
19, at 1806-17 (attachment K to statement of Assistant Attorney General Reynolds). 
238. 42 u.s.c. § 1973k (1982). 
239. 42 U.S.C. § 1973d makes no provision for judicial review, and the sole method of termi-
nating the designation is through the declaratory judgment proceeding provided in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973k. See 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 162. 
240. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 215 (minority views of Sen. East). 
241. See supra text accompanying note 232. 
242. 383 u.s. 301, 336-37 (1966). 
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in federal observers,243 the Attorney General has established internal 
guidelines which, in the opinion of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
protect a covered jurisdiction against unjustified designation. 244 Both 
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees concluded that the ap-
pointment of federal examiners constitutes strong evidence of continu-
ing voting rights violations, thus justifying the denial of bailout, and 
that there has been no past abuse of the process by the Attorney 
GeneraF45 
3. Section 5 Compliance 
The final element of the specific compliance component is perhaps 
the most controversial of all the new bailout requirements. Under the 
1982 amendments, the covered jurisdiction must demonstrate that for 
the preceding ten-year period it and all governmental units within its 
territory have complied with section 5 of the Act, including the require-
ments that no changes in voting practices or procedures have been en-
forced without preclearance and that all such proposed changes to 
which objection ultimately was made have been repealed.246 More-
over, the covered jurisdiction must show that no submissions were 
made during the period to which objection successfully was made by 
the Attorney General, or, in the event preclearance was sought through 
the declaratory judgment process, that no declaratory judgment was 
denied during the period.247 Finally, bailout is precluded during the 
period in which the covered jurisdiction is seeking preclearance of a 
change.248 
With the adoption of the nationwide ban on the use of tests and de-
vices under· the 1970 amendments to the Act,249 the section 5 
preclearance requirement became the primary feature of the Act's spe-
243. Assistant Attorney General Reynolds was not certain whether the designation of a cov-
ered jurisdiction for the appointment of examiners as the statutory precursor for the appointment 
of federal observers would bar bailout. 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 1704-05. 
244. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 52 n.180; see a/so UNFULFILLED GOALS, supra 
note 47, at 9-10. 
245. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 52; 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 40. 
246. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(4){D), 96 Stat. 132 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(D) (1982)). 
247. Jd § 2(b)(4)(E}, 96 Stat. 132 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(E) (1982)). 
248. Id 
249. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. The nationwide ban on the use of tests and 
devices, imposed on a temporary basis in 1970, was made permanent in 1975. See supra note 43 
and accompanying text. 
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cial provisions applicable to the covered jurisdictions. When exten-
sions of the Act were considered in 1970 and 1975, substantial evidence 
of noncompliance with section 5 was presented to Congress, and this 
evidence constituted a major justification for the first two extensions of 
the Act.250 While the evidence presented during consideration of the 
1982 amendments demonstrated that compliance had improved, in the 
sense that the number of submissions of proposed changes had in-
creased dramatically since 1975, additional evidence was presented that 
a number of covered jurisdictions had continued to defy the Act either 
by failing to submit proposed changes or by implementing changes to 
which objections had been made by the Attorney GeneraF51 More-
over, the number of objections made by the Attorney General since 
1975 had been in excess of 500, including numerous recent objections 
to such fundamental concerns as statewide reapportionment and an-
nexations. 252 Since the primary benefit to be gained by bailout is the 
elimination of the preclearance mandate, it is understandable that a 
past track record of compliance with section 5 would be deemed rele-
vant to the question whether continued coverage is necessary and ap-
propriate. The inquiry into section 5 compliance, moreover, logically 
would include both the record of timely submissions of proposed 
changes as well as the record of action taken in response to such sub-
missions by the Attorney General (or the District of Columbia District 
Court, if preclearance were sought through the declaratory judgment 
process). 
Under the new bailout standard, a covered jurisdiction and all gov-
ernmental units within must demonstrate a ten-year record of having 
enforced no changes in voting practices and procedures without 
preclearance. The Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that the effi-
cacy of section 5 depends almost entirely on voluntary and timely sub-
missions of proposed changes by the covered jurisdictions.253 The 
Department of Justice has no independent mechanism to monitor sec-
tion 5 compliance.254 Although voluntary compliance since 1975 ap-
250. 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 40, at 15-20; 1970 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, at 9. 
251. S~~ 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 47-48. See generally 1982 Senate Hearings, 
.lllf'ra note 19, at 374-89 (statement of Laughlin McDonald); id. at 611-18 (statement of Steve 
Suits); id. at 1258-69 (statement of Julius L. Chambers); id. at 1365-80 (testimony of Drew S. 
Days). 
252. 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 11-12 (table). 
253. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 47. 
254. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 396 (1971) ("Failure of the affected governments to 
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parently has increased, 255 if bailout were not made dependent on a 
record of timely submission, as noted earlier, there would be no incen-
tive for jurisdictions to improve or maintain a record of compliance, 
thus further hindering efforts to enforce section 5. 
While the requirement appears both necessary and appropriate as a 
condition of bailout, several operative limitations should be empha-
sized. First, the requirement assumes that the preclearance mandate is 
clearly and widely understood by governmental units in covered juris-
dictions. The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Report argued that com-
plete compliance with the preclearance requirement is practically 
impossible and that, as a result, bailout effectively will be impossible 
for most jurisdictions.256 The full Senate Judiciary Committee re-
sponded, however, that preclearance requirements are well-publicized, 
that assistance is readily available, and that "common sense" will con-
tinue to prevail to negate the effect of "de minimis" violations.257 Sec-
ond, because the bailout mechanism is written in "all or nothing" 
terms, where the right of the greater jurisdiction to bailout is linked to 
compliance by lesser governmental units within, a form of vicarious 
responsibility is placed upon covered jurisdictions seeking bailout;258 
thus, while the covered jurisdiction seeking bailout itself may demon-
strate a ten-year record of total compliance, bailout will be denied if 
any unit of local government within the territory of the covered juris-
diction has enforced a proposed change in voting practices or proce-
dures without obtaining approval. This will be so even though the 
covered jurisdiction seeking bailout possesses no lawful authority to 
control the activities of the local government officials responsible for 
noncompliance. 
comply with the statutory requirement [of voluntary submissions] would nullify the entire scheme 
since the Department of Justice does not have the resources to police effectively all the States and 
subdivisions covered by the Act."). 
When the Department of Justice receives information that a jurisdiction may have implemented 
changes without preclearance, it sends a "please submit" letter to the covered jurisdiction. In 
1980, the Department sent 124 such letters. The Department received responses from 79 such 
jurisdictions that indicated the 78 changes had been made without preclearance. 1981 HousE 
REPORT, supra note 76, at 13; UNFULFILLED GOALS, supra note 47, at 72. 
255. Between 1975 and September 30, 1981, 39,837 preclearance submissions were received. 
1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 1745. From 1965 through 1974, only 4,476 submissions 
were received. Id. at 1744. 
256. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 163. 
257. I d. at 48. 
258. id. at 163; id. at 216 (minority views of Sen. East). 
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Finally, this provision will preclude bailout whenever a change has 
been implemented prior to obtaining preclearance. Bailout will be 
barred even though a submission ultimately was made and approved; 
or even though an objection to the change ultimately was withdrawn by 
the Department of Justice; or even though a decision of the District of 
Columbia District Court denying a declaratory judgment for the pro-
posed change was vacated on appeal. 259 Section 5 prohibits enforce-
ment of changes prior to obtaining approval, and bailout will be denied 
for a period of ten years from the last day upon which an implemented 
change was in effect before approval was obtained; this is so even 
though the change ultimately may be determined to have had no dis-
criminatory purpose or effect.260 
The 1982 amendments also require that the covered jurisdiction 
"have repealed all changes . . . to which the Attorney General has suc-
cessfully objected or to which the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia has denied a declaratory judgment."261 It is un-
clear what this requirement added to the bailout standard. Because 
section 5 requires prior approval before a change lawfully can be im-
plemented, why should it be considered significant that the jurisdiction 
repealed the provision if the Attorney General objected to it and, there-
fore, blocked its lawful implementation?262 The enforcement of a 
change without prior federal approval-an unlawful act that bars 
bailout in itself-is indistinguishable from the continued use of the 
change after submission and disapproval; both are in violation of sec-
tion 5 and would be covered by the language barring bailout whenever 
a change has been "enforced without preclearance." 
The House Judiciary Committee Report states that the covered juris-
diction must "repeal all legislation and other voting changes that were 
objected to before they are permitted to bail out so that they will not be 
able to enforce any such legislation once they are exempted from the 
Act's coverage."263 This language suggests that significance is to be at-
tached to a formal repeal of the disapproved legislation or administra-
tive action. This largely symbolic act could cause interpretive problems 
259. I d. at 48; 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 42. 
260. 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 42. 
261. Voting Rights Act amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(4)(D), 96 Stat. 131 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)( I )(0) ( 1982)). 
262. 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 68 (dissenting views of Rep. Butler). 
263. Id. at 41. 
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when the action disapproved was a result of administrative or executive 
action that was never formalized by legislation or administrative rule 
or regulation. There are changes in voting practices and procedures 
that may require preclearance that can be implemented by informal 
executive or administrative action;264 the "repeal" of such changes may 
take the form of nothing more than informal action to restore the status 
quo and cease enforcement of the change. 
More importantly, the House Judiciary Committee's justification for 
the repeal requirement was that it is necessary to ensure that the change 
cannot be implemented once bailout is granted.265 This argument ap-
pears to be misplaced, and does not justify inclusion of the require-
ment. It is true, of course, that a provision still on the books but 
unenforceable because of Justice Department disapproval, could be re-
vived and enforced once bailout has been obtained and preclearance is 
no longer required. It is also true that even if the provision is formally 
repealed, it could be reenacted following bailout and enforced without 
preclearance; but, as will be demonstrated later, the 1982 amendments 
also apparently contain a recapture provision that will preclude reen-
actment of previously rejected changes.266 The formal repeal of the 
change, therefore, accomplishes nothing of substance and simply will 
add to the uncertainty regarding the bailout criteria. 
Finally, note that the repeal requirement applies only to those sub-
missions to which the Attorney General has "successfully" objected.267 
If the covered jurisdiction, following Department of Justice disap-
proval, submits exactly the same change to the District Court for the 
District of Columbia for approval through the declaratory judgment 
process, which it may do, 268 and the District Court approves the 
change, repeal apparently will not be required and the jurisdiction can 
enforce the change thereafter.269 
264. See, e.g., Board ofEduc. v. White, 439 U.S. 32 (1978) (decision by county school board 
requiring employees to take unpaid leave of absence while running for political office); NAACP v. 
Georgia, 494 F. Supp. 668 (D. Ga. 1980) (decision by county board of elections not to consider 
registration drives conducted by other persons or organizations). 
265. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
266. See infta text accompanying note 354. 
267. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(l)(D) (1976)). 
268. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 391 (1971); see also United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 
U.S. 144, 175 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part). The district court will undertake a de novo 
review of the purpose or effect of the submission, but some deference will be paid to the prior 
administrative judgment of the Department of Justice. Id 
269. Enforcement of the change after Justice Department disapproval but before the same 
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In addition to the prior submission and repeal requirements, the cov-
ered jurisdiction also must demonstrate that for the ten-year period 
prior to the bailout suit the "Attorney General has not interposed any 
objection that has not been overturned by a final judgment of a court 
and no declaratory judgment has been denied under section 5.'>27° This 
bar to bailout is premised on the assumption that rejection of proposed 
changes evinces the need for continued coverage.271 In addition, 
bailout is not permitted while submissions or declaratory judgment ac-
tions are pending.272 
A number of substantive and interpretive problems have been raised 
with respect to the "no objection" requirement (this provision alone 
will operate immediately, beginning with the 1984 effective date of the 
new bailout standard, to bar bailout until at least 1990 for numerous 
covered jurisdictions, including the entire states qua states of Alabama, 
Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississipi, South Carolina, Texas, and 
Virginia).273 One major problem with the "no objection" requirement, 
according to opponents of the provision, is that objection by the Attor-
ney General to submissions may be made on grounds having nothing 
to do with whether the proposed change has a discriminatory purpose 
or effect, and in other cases an initial objection may be withdrawn once 
the jurisdiction supplies additional data.274 Another problem noted by 
opponents is that a covered jurisdiction may be unable in advance to 
determine whether a proposed change is objectionable, despite good 
faith efforts to comply with the section 5 standard of no discriminatory 
purpose or effect; this problem would appear to be especially prevalent 
in redistricting submissions.275 Finally, opponents of the requirement 
argued that a "politically motivated" Attorney General could sabotage 
a covered jurisdiction's right to bailout by filing objections to a submis-
change was approved by the district court, however, would be a violation of the Act and would 
bar bailout for a ten-year period thereafter. See supra text accompanying notes 259-60. 
270. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(4)(E), 96 Stat. 132 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(l)(E) (1982)). 
271. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 48-49; see also City of Rome v. United States, 
446 u.s. 156, 181 (1980). 
272. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(l)(E) (1976). 
273. 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 68 (dissenting views of Rep. Butler); see also 1982 
Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 1742-84 (statistics showing extent of covered jurisdictions' com-
pliance with Act through 1981). 
274. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 163-64; id at 218 (minority views of Sen. East); 
1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 68 (dissenting views of Rep. Butler). 
275. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 49. 
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sion solely to preclude bailout.276 
As noted previously, one of the problems identified by opponents of 
the requirement was that the Attorney General may enter an objection 
to a submission solely because the covered jurisdiction fails to provide 
adequate information to allow the Department of Justice to evaluate 
the impact of the proposed change. The Senate Judiciary Committee 
Report acknowledges the existence of this problem, but suggests that 
Department of Justice policy effectively negates adverse consequences 
in most instances. The report states that only a "handful" of objections 
have been made on this basis over the life of the Act. 277 The report 
also asserts that when the jurisdiction supplies the required information 
within a reasonable time, the Attorney General will withdraw the ob-
jection.278 Finally, the report states that when inadequate information 
initially is presented, the Attorney General's request for supporting 
data tolls the statutory period during which the Department of Justice 
may object, and that formal objection will be entered only if the cov-
ered jurisdiction flatly refuses to supply additional necessary 
information. 279 
The effect of a ''withdrawal" of an objection also was considered by 
the Senate Judiciary Committee. The committee report states that 
when a covered jurisdiction submits a request for reconsideration of a 
formal objection by the Attorney General and provides new or addi-
tional data, the withdrawal of the objection by the Attorney General 
will not preclude bailout if the new or additional information is sub-
mitted within a "reasonable time" following the initial objection.280 If, 
however, following an objection, the covered jurisdiction submits a 
wholly new or revised change which is approved, the earlier objection 
will stand and will preclude bailout for a ten-year period.Z81 The same 
result will follow if the reason for a later approval (of the same or a 
slightly revised plan) was due to changed circumstances which lessened 
276. Id 
277. Id 
278. Id 
279. Id A preclearance submission may be enforced unless the Attorney General objects 
within sixty days. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). Under Department of Justice regulations, a request 
for additional information "tolls" the running of the 60-day period, and if the jurisdiction supplies 
additional information in response to the request, the 60-day period co=ences anew. 28 C.F.R. 
§§ 51.8, 51.35(a) (1983). The validity of these regulations has been upheld. See City of Rome v. 
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 171-72 (1980); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 541 (1973). 
280. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 49. 
281. Id at 49-50. 
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the impact of the proposed change; because the proposed change was 
objectionable when first proposed, it will preclude bailout.282 
The Senate Judiciary Committee also expressed concern about cases 
in which the Department of Justice withdraws objections to proposed 
changes long after the initial objection and without documentation of 
the changed circumstances which led to the reconsideration. 283 The 
Senate Judiciary Committee Report expresses the view that withdrawal 
of an objection, if it is to negate the impact of an earlier objection, must 
be limited to cases in which reconsideration is requested "shortly" after 
the objection and to cases in which there is a "documented basis of 
substantially changed circumstances."284 
The Senate Judiciary Committee also considered the argument that 
ignorance of section 5 standards may contribute to objections and that 
it is unfair to preclude bailout for a ten-year period when a proposed 
change that was rejected was submitted in good faith. This problem 
was alleged to be especially critical in the case of small, local political 
units that may not have counsel capable of analyzing the nuances of 
section 5 standards.285 The fact of "all or nothing" bailout, where the 
failure of a lesser governmental unit to meet bailout standards will pre-
clude bailout for the greater jurisdiction, exacerbates the problem.286 
According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, jurisdictions subject to 
section 5 can and often do informally discuss proposed changes with 
the Department of Justice, and will receive input from the Department 
prior to a formal submission.287 Moreover, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee Report suggests that local governments can seek assistance from 
the state Attorney General.288 In sum, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
282. ld at 50 n.l72. 
283. /d at 50. 
284. ld 
285. /d at 49. 
286. See supra notes 197-213 and accompanying text. If a small, local unit of government 
submits a change that is objectionable, both the entire state and the political subdivision in which 
it is located will be barred from bailout for a ten-year period. See 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra 
note 77, at 49. 
287. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 49. Senator East disputed this assertion by the 
Committee, arguing that "little if any opportunity exists to clear changes in advance . . . or to 
have formal presubmission consultations." Id at 219 (minority views of Sen. East). Both Senator 
East and Representative Butler argued that the effect of this provision will be to discourage 
needed changes in election laws. See id; 1981 HousE REPoRT, supra note 76, at 67 (dissenting 
v1ews of Rep. Butler). 
288. 1982 SENATE REPoRT, supra note 77, at 49. 
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concluded that any jurisdiction desiring to avoid the submission of ob-
jectionable changes can do so. 
Finally, the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected the argument that a 
politically motivated Attorney General could preclude bailout at will 
by objecting to a submission. Since the Attorney General's decision 
under section 5 is not, as such, subject to judicial review, abuses could 
occur. The Committee responded by observing that while judicial re-
view of the decision is not available, the covered jurisdiction may seek 
an independent de novo review of the proposed change in the District 
Court for the District of Columbia.289 Approval of a submission 
through a declaratory judgment action after rejection of the submission 
by the Attorney General would negate the effect of the objection, and 
bailout still would be available.290 
B. The Affirmative Action Component 
In addition to the bailout criteria previously described, the 1982 
amendments prescribe a series of additional requirements that a cov-
ered jurisdiction must fulfi11 in order to be exempted from the Act's 
special provisions. These bailout requirements are designed to force 
covered jurisdictions to eliminate certain voting practices and proce-
dures as a condition to bailout that may not, as such, constitute a viola-
tion of the Act. In order to obtain bailout, the covered jurisdiction 
must demonstrate that it and all governmental units within its territory 
(1) have eliminated voting procedures and methods of election which 
inhibit or dilute equal access to the electoral process; (2) have engaged 
in constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment of per-
sons exercising rights protected under the Act; and (3) have engaged in 
other constructive efforts, such as expanded opportunity for convenient 
registration and voting for every person of voting age and the appoint-
ment of minority persons as election officials throughout the jurisdic-
tion and at all stages of the election and registration process.291 
Two important preliminary considerations are relevant to an evalua-
289. See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
290. Id Neither the House nor the Senate Judiciary Committee addressed the issue whether 
denial of a declaratory judgment in the district court that was vacated on appeal would preclude 
bailout. As long as the proposed change had not been implemented prior to the appellate deci-
sion, it would seem logical to infer that bailout would not be precluded. 
291. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(4)(F), 96 Stat. 132 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(l)(F) (1982)). 
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tion of these requirements. First, the "all or nothing" approach to 
bailout is continued. The state or political subdivision seeking to bail 
out must assume responsibility for the actions (or lack thereof) of all 
political units of government within its geographic territory, even 
though it may not have the legal authority to compel actions required 
by the Act.292 Second, the burden of proof rests with the jurisdiction 
seeking to bail out.293 This requirement will be particularly burden-
some with respect to the first of the affirmative action criteria-the re-
quirement that the covered jurisdiction eliminate all voting procedures 
and methods of election which inhibit or dilute equal access to the elec-
toral process. While the existence of a particular voting practice or pro-
cedure in a covered jurisdiction may not be subject to successful 
challenge under other provisions of the Act, such as section 2, because 
the burden of proof would be on the challenging party in such action, 
the burden of proof will be reversed in the bailout suit, and the covered 
jurisdiction will be required to prove that the particular voting practice 
or procedure is nondiscriminatory (i.e., that it does not dilute or inhibit 
equal access to the electoral process). 
It is the locus of the burden of proof in the bailout suit, more than 
any other single factor, that contributes to the view held by some mem-
bers of Congress that the affirmative action criteria constitute unrea-
sonable bailout requirements. Unlike the specific compliance 
requirements, which simply evaluate compliance with the existing 
mandates of the Act, the affirmative action requirements introduce 
wholly new features to the Act. Although a covered jurisdiction is not 
required under the Act, for example, to demonstrate that it has made 
affirmative efforts to eliminate discriminatory practices, it is required to 
do so in order to bailout from the Act's special provisions. In a very 
real sense, the 1982 bailout amendments introduced new substantive 
requirements for covered jurisdictions, albeit under the guise of the 
bailout standard. 
1. Elimination of Voting Procedures and Methods of Election 
Which Inhibit or .Dilute Equal Access 
The first aspect of the affirmative action component provides that a 
covered jurisdiction must prove that it and all governmental units 
292. Id 
293. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 56; see supra notes 181-83 and accompanying 
text. 
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within its territory have eliminated "voting procedures and methods of 
election which inhibit or dilute equal access to the political process."294 
There are numerous interpretive and practical problems with the re-
quirement. Read literally a covered jurisdiction would be required to 
demonstrate that each and every "voting procedure" and "method of 
election" employed within the covered jurisdiction did not "inhibit or 
dilute" equal access. Aside from the problem of identification of the 
varied and myriad practices and procedures to be tested (and it is in-
deed unclear what would be covered) is the additional problem of 
proving a negative; that is, proving that each and every voting practice 
and method of election does not inhibit or dilute equal access to the 
political process. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report suggests that a covered ju-
risdiction will not be required to offer affirmative proof (and, presuma-
bly, to plead) with respect to each and every voting practice or method 
of election. Instead, the covered jurisdiction will be required to assume 
the burden of proof with respect to a given voting practice or method of 
election only when the Department of Justice or an intervenor alleges 
that a specific voting procedure or election method discriminates.295 
Once a voting practice or method of election has been challenged, how-
ever, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report states that a covered ju-
risdiction will have to present empirical evidence of non -discriminatory 
purpose or effect.296 Nothing in the text of the amendments, however, 
purports to place the burden of raising the issue on the Department of 
Justice (or on an intervenor), and the language of the Act does not 
support this interpretation by the committee. Unless the committee's 
view is accepted, however, the covered jurisdiction will be required to 
assume a nearly impossible burden of pleading and proof.-an analysis 
of each and every voting procedure and method of election to ensure 
that none inhibit or dilute equal access to the electoral process. The 
House Judiciary Committee Report also suggests that the range of vot-
ing practices and methods of election subject to consideration are 
broad indeed, and include such practices as voter registration proce-
294. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(F)(i) (1976). 
295. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 54. 
296. Id; see also 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 43 (''This requirement cannot be met 
. . . simply by claims that the jurisdiction has no structural barriers, but rather calls for empirical 
evidence that its methods of election and voting procedures have neither the purpose nor the effect 
of discriminating."). 
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dures, at-large or multimember districts, majority vote requirements, 
anti-single-shot laws, and the means by which officials are elected.297 
Perhaps more significant is the uncertainty created by the standard 
"inhibit or dilute equal access to the electoral process." Assistant At-
torney General William Bradford Reynolds, testifying before the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, indicated that the language was likely to 
produce a "great deal" of litigation. 298 Both the House and Senate 
Judiciary Committee Reports suggest that this language was intended 
to impose a "results" oriented test; that is, a voting procedure or 
method of election which "inhibits or dilutes equal access to the electo-
ral process" is one which produces a discriminatory result.299 More 
specifically, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report states that the test 
is the same as that for a challenge to a voting procedure or method of 
election under section 2 of the Act, except that the burden of proof is 
on the covered jurisdiction seeking to bail out.300 
This bailout requirement, therefore, must be read in the context of 
the recent litigation under and statutory amendments to section 2. The 
use of the bailout standard as a method of dealing with the problem of 
at-large methods of electing local officials is potentially of great signifi-
cance. As the recent Supreme Court decisions in City of Mobile v. 
Bolden 301 and Rogers v. Lodge302 make clear, a primary obstacle to a 
297. 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 42-43. 
298. 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 1706. 
299. 1982 SENATE REPORT,supra note 77, at 54 ("In determining whether procedures or meth-
ods inhibit or dilute equal access to the electoral process, the standard to be used is the results 
test. . , ."); 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 74, at42 ("The Committee believes that the jurisdic-
tion seeking to bailout should meet certain positive and results oriented requirements. . . ."). 
300. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 54. 
301. 446 U.S. 55 (1980); see supra note 70. 
302. 458 U.S. 613 (1982). Rogers involved section 2 and fourteenth and fifteenth amendment 
challenges to the maintenance of an at-large system of electing the Board of Commissioners in 
Burke County, Georgia. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment that the 
method of election was maintained for a discriminatory purpose or intent. The district court's 
conclusion that the at-large system was maintained for a discriminatory purpose was based upon 
an evaluation of the factors outlined in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (6th Cir. 1973), aff'd 
on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 363 (1975) (per 
curiam). Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Bolden held that ''the presence of the indicia relied 
on in Zimmer may afford some evidence of a discriminatory purpose but the mere existence of this 
criteria was not a substitute for a finding of discriminatory purpose. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 
U.S. 55, 73 (1980). In Rogers, the Supreme Court held that although the district court employed 
the Zimmer mode of analysis it used the criteria as the basis for concluding that the at-large 
system was maintained for a discriminatory purpose. 458 U.S. at 620-21. 
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successful challenge to an at-large system is that ofproof.303 While it is 
clear that the locus of the burden of proof was even more critical when 
the standard was that of proof of intentional or purposeful discrimina-
tion (as it was prior to the 1982 amendments), it is likely that problems 
of proof will continue under a results or effects standard. Section 2 
challenges to a jurisdiction's use of an at-large or multimember system 
may be brought nationwide and without regard to a jurisdiction's cov-
erage under the Act's special provisions;304 in fact, however, most such 
actions have been brought in covered jurisdictions.305 The burden of 
proof in a section 2 challenge to an at-large system rests with the plain-
tiff-challenger.306 Even with the modification of section 2 to establish a 
results or effects test, it is likely that many actions will fail, as evidenced 
by the fact that until the Bolden case, some lower federal court deci-
sions considered and rejected challenges to at-large systems under a 
results or effects test.307 If, however, the burden of proof is shifted to 
the jurisdiction maintaining an at-large system, given the vagaries of 
most such cases a different outcome can be envisioned solely on the 
basis of the locus of the burden of proof. Covered jurisdictions seeking 
to bail out may be held hostage to the Act's special provisions by the 
existence of at-large methods of electing local officials. While an at-
large system may be relatively immune to challenge under section 2, a 
covered jurisdiction may not feel particularly sanguine about its ability 
to defend its use when it must assume the burden of proving that the 
system does not inhibit or dilute "equal access to the electoral process." 
Because of the clear congressional intent that this bailout require-
ment is to complement section 2, it is curious that Congress did not 
employ the language of section 2 to describe the standard by which 
voting procedures and methods of elections are to be judged in the 
bailout suit. Section 2, as amended, prohibits voting standards, prac-
tices and procedures which result in the denial or abridgment of the 
303. See infra notes 306-07 and accompanying text. 
304. See supra note 9. For a recent example of the application of section 2 in a non-covered 
jurisdiction, see Taylor v. Haywood County, 544 F. Supp. 1122 (J/.D. Tenn. 1982). 
305. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 68. 
306. See 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 27 ("Plaintiffs must either prove ... intent, 
or, alternatively, must show that the challenged system or practice . . . results in minorities being 
denied equal access to the political process."). 
307. See, e.g., Hendrix v. Joseph, 559 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1977); Bradas v. Rapidas Parish 
Police Jury, 508 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1975); Castery v. St. John the Baptist Parish Police Jury, 485 
F. Supp. 236 (E.D. La. 1980). 
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right to vote on account of race or color or in contravention of the 
language minority provisions of the Act; the section goes on to provide 
that a violation of section 2 may be established if 
"it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election 
. . . are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citi-
zens protected [by the Act] ... in that its members have less opportunity 
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process 
and to elect representatives of their choice."308 
The 1982 amendments to section 2 also provide that nothing in the 
section confers "a right to have members of a protected class elected in 
numbers equal to their proportion in the population."309 
The language of section 2, therefore, speaks in terms of standards, 
practices and procedures that deny equality of access to the political 
process by denying to members of a minority group an equal opportu-
nity to participate and to elect representatives of their choice. Without 
the benefit of knowledge gained through an examination of the judicial 
treatment of section 2 claims, it would be reasonable to question 
whether a voting procedure or method of election which "inhibits or 
dilutes equality of access to the electoral process" (the bailout standard) 
necessarily is one that also must result in members of a minority group 
having "less opportunity . . . to participate in the political process and 
to elect representatives of their choice." In fact, the history of section 2 
litigation involving challenges to at-large methods of election demon-
strates that the language of section 2, as amended in 1982, was taken 
almost verbatim from the leading pre-Bo!den decision involving a con-
stitutional challenge to at-large election methods. This decision, White 
v. Register ,310 held that a challenge to an at-large method of electing 
officials could only be sustained when "the political processes leading 
to nomination and election were not equally open to participation of 
the group in questions."311 Earlier, however, in Reynolds v. Sims,312 
the Supreme Court had referred to the right of voters to have their 
308. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1976). The final version of amended section 2 was proposed by 
Senator Dole. For a discussion of the events leading to the Dole proposal, see Blumstein, Defining 
and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach From the Voting 
Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REv. 633, 689-701 (1982). 
309. 402 u.s.c. § 1973 (1982). 
310. 412 u.s. 755 (1973). 
311. /d at 766. 
312. 377 u.s. 533 (1964). 
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votes counted without "debasement or dilution."313 While Reynolds 
involved dilution of voting strength as a result of population disparities 
among legislative districts, in Fortson v. Dorsey314 the Supreme Court 
made clear that the use of multimember districts also might produce 
the prohibited dilution of voting strength. The question left unresolved 
in both Reynolds and Fortson was the circumstances under which im-
permissible "dilution" might be found. Decisions such as White v. Reg-
ister315 and Whitcomb v. Chavis316 held that impermissible dilution in 
an at-large system cannot be demonstrated simply by showing that mi-
norities have not been elected in proportion to their voting strength; 
instead, a challenger must show denial of equal access to the processes 
leading to nomination and election.317 
It is thus reasonably clear that the language in the new bailout stan-
dard requiring a covered jurisdiction to show that elimination ofvoting 
procedures and methods of election which "dilute or inhibit equal ac-
cess to the electoral process" is simply descriptive terminology referring 
to the kind of dilution prohibited by section 2. A voting procedure or 
method of election which dilutes or inhibits equal access to the electo-
ral process (and which must be eliminated before bailout is permitted) 
is one which, under all the circumstances, effectively provides members 
of minority groups with less opportunity to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice (i.e., one that is 
maintained in violation of section 2).318 
Representative Butler objected to this (and the other constructive ef-
forts criteria) on the ground that no rights or safeguards for minority 
voters are established beyond those which already existed. He argued 
313. Id at 555. 
314. 379 U.S. 433 (1965). Fortson involved a quantitative one-person, one-vote challenge to a 
multimember district. The plaintiffs alleged that since groups of residents of a multimember dis-
trict could be outvoted by other groups, their votes were diluted in violation of Reynolds. The 
Supreme Court disagreed, but in the process stated that "[i]t might well be that • . . a multi-
member apportionment scheme . . . would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength 
of racial or political elements .... " Id at 439. 
315. 412 u.s. 755 (1973). 
316. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). Whitcomb was the first case to reach the Supreme Court which 
involved a racial dilution challenge to the maintenance of a multimember scheme of electing 
government officials. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove unconstitu-
tional dilution of their voting strength. Id at 149-50. 
317. 412 U.S. at 766; 403 U.S. at 155. 
318. For a discussion of the standard of proof under section 2 and the evolution of the consti-
tutional test, see Blumstein, supra note 308, at 661-73, 701-14. 
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that these requirements state the obvious: in order to bail out, a cov-
ered jurisdiction must have complied with the Act.319 It is true, of 
course, that the requirement that a covered jurisdiction have eliminated 
voting procedures and methods of election which dilute or inhibit 
equal access to the electoral process is, when read in the context of the 
clear congressional intent, a requirement of compliance with section 2 
of the Act. As was mentioned earlier, however, the reversal of the bur-
den of proof on the issue is a significant factor and may affect the result 
in a given case. 
Representative Butler also questioned the substantive content of this 
requirement. He asserted that the provision requires an examination of 
such fundamental features of the American political process as voter 
registration, tabulation of ballots, redistricting, and the administration 
of at-large systems. The use of these voting procedures and methods of 
election in an insidious fashion, he argued, is not cause to eliminate 
them as required by the language of the standard. Instead, such prac-
tices should be changed so that they are implemented in accordance 
with the law.320 The point that Representative Butler intended to make 
is not at all clear, especially when the question is the maintenance of an 
at-large system. How can a covered jurisdiction fairly implement (and 
yet still maintain) an at-large system so as to negate the denial of equal 
opportunity to participate that was alleged to exist? On the other hand, 
at-large voting systems are often utilized together with other devices, 
such as majority vote requirements, anti-single-shot laws, and placing 
requirements, all of which tend to magnify the adverse impact of at-
large systems on minority voters.321 The elimination of one or all of 
these devices may be sufficient to overcome the negative effect of at-
large systems. Nevertheless, these "enhancing devices" must be elimi-
nated if found to constitute impermissible dilution; it is difficult to see 
how they could be implemented in a fashion that would overcome their 
discriminatory effect. With respect to other voting procedures and 
methods of election that could prevent bailout because of their dilutent 
or inhibitory effect, such as racially discriminatory redistricting or the 
location of voting registration stations, it would be the elimination of 
the practice, as required by the bailout statute, that would cure the 
problem. There is no suggestion that Congress intended to prohibit 
319. 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 69. 
320. /d. 
321. Su supra note 66. 
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voting registration and certainly no suggestion that redistricting must 
be prohibited in order to achieve bailout; rather, a covered jurisdiction 
would be required to change its voting registration scheme or change 
its districting plan in order to comply with the Act. 
2 Efforts to Eliminate Intimidation and Harassment 
The second aspect of the affirmative action component requires a 
covered jurisdiction to demonstrate that it and all governmental units 
within "have engaged in constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation 
and harassment of persons exercising rights protected under [the 
Act]."322 The Senate Judiciary Committee declared that this require-
ment was necessary to demonstrate a covered jurisdiction's "firm com-
mitment" to minority voting rights, "particularly at a time of renewed 
concern about violence-prone vigilante or paramilitary organizations, 
hate groups and other means of physical intimidation."323 Both the 
House and Senate Judiciary Committees referred to the "long-term im-
pact" such harassment and intimidation have on minority voters and 
their communities. 324 Evidence was presented at both the House and 
the Senate hearings on the 1982 amendments indicating that harass-
ment or intimidation of minority voters and candidates occurs with sur-
prising frequency,325 and the 1981 report of the Civil Rights 
Commission documented numerous instances of such unlawful 
activity.326 
A covered jurisdiction apparently is not required to show the com-
plete absence of incidents of harassment and intimidation in order to 
bail out. On the other hand, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report 
states that "if there is evidence that such intimidation and harassment, 
or a credible threat of it occurring, has been a factor in limited minority 
participation, then the jurisdiction must take reasonable steps to elimi-
nate that danger and to make it clear that such abhorrent activity . . . 
will not be tolerated."327 The quoted material contains two points that 
are worthy of additional comment. First, the Senate Report appears to 
322. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(4)(F)(ii), 96 Stat. 132 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(F)(ii) (1982)). 
323. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 54. 
324. I d.; 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 43. 
325. 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 747-54, 1365-80; 1981 House Hearings, supra note 
54, at 289, 821, 1566, 1579, 1985. 
326. UNFULFILLED GOALS, supra note 47, at 22-24, 34-35. 
327. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 54 (emphasis added). The Senate Judiciary 
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endorse a burden of "constructive efforts," whenever there exists a 
credible threat of harassment or intimidation. Second, the report sug-
gests that constructive efforts are required only when harassment or 
intimidation has been a "factor in limited minority participation" in 
the political process. 
With respect to the first point, a genuine ambiguity exists. Does the 
bailout standard contain an implicit assumption that harassment and 
intimidation of voters is present in every covered jurisdiction so that 
constructive efforts will be required of every jurisdiction seeking to bail 
out? The Senate Judiciary Committee Report states that the require-
ment is "not meant to imply that the described conduct has occurred in 
all covered jurisdictions."328 On the other hand, it is unclear from the 
language of the statute what kinds of occurrences will trigger the neces-
sity of demonstrating that constructive efforts were undertaken. The 
language of the Senate Report further complicates the problem by sug-
gesting that a credible threat of intimidation and harassment will suf-
fice to trigger the requirement. There is no support for this view in the 
language of the statute. The statute speaks in terms of the need to 
make constructive efforts to "eliminate" the proscribed conduct; it does 
not require the covered jurisdiction to make constructive efforts to pre-
vent the occurrence of the activity, at least until such time as incidents 
of harassment and intimidation have occurred with sufficient frequency 
that constructive efforts are required. If the requirement is properly 
construed as requiring constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation 
and harassment only when they are shown to exist, as opposed to one 
requiring every covered jurisdiction to make the effort, even when it 
would only be to prevent their occurrence, some minimum standard 
must be developed. Further, some standard must be developed to de-
fine how long the constructive efforts must continue following the last 
known incidents of harassment or intimidation, unless the requirement 
is to be interpreted as mandating a continuing effort until bailout is 
obtained, even though the last known instance may have occurred 
many years prior to the bailout suit. 
The second problem raised by the Senate Judiciary Committee Re-
port-the suggestion that this constructive efforts requirement arises 
only when there is evidence that intimidation and harassment is a fac-
Committee stated that "(c)ommunities are not held absolutely liable for all acts by their private 
citizens." I d 
328. ld at 55. 
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tor in limiting minority participation in the electoral process-likewise 
finds no support in either the language or logic of the statute. All juris-
dictions covered by the Act's special provisions were, at the time of 
coverage, jurisdictions with historically low voter turnout.329 Since the 
adoption of the Act, however, voter registration and turnout has in-
creased dramatically in the covered jurisdictions, and in most places 
approaches the national average.330 Moreover, continuation of cover-
age under the Act's special provisions has never been conditioned on 
the existence of low levels of registration or voting. While harassment 
and intimidation of minority voters undoubtedly contribute to low 
voter participation, the major features of the Act-the special provi-
sions-were designed to deal with the use of tests and devices as a pre-
requisites to voting and to monitor changes in voting practices and 
procedures regardless of the context. Finally, harassment and intimi-
dation of minority voters is an evil that should be eliminated even if it 
results in only one minority voter being dissuaded from participating, 
and one of the Act's original provisions, applicable nationwide, makes 
it a crime for any person to "intimidate, threaten or coerce" any person 
exercising the right to vote.331 In sum, it is the existence of intimidation 
or harassment of minority voters in any context, and regardless of the 
result, that is the evil to be eliminated; this bailout requirement should 
be construed to require constructive efforts to eliminate the prohibited 
conduct without the need to show, additionally, that such conduct has 
contributed to low voter turnout. 
The final major interpretive feature of this requirement as far as its 
applicability is concerned is the absence of a "state action" require-
ment. Both the House and Senate Judiciary Committee Reports state 
that constructive efforts to eliminate harassment and intimidation are 
required to ensure that such conduct, whether by government officials 
or others,332 will not be repeated. The absence of a state action require-
ment is consistent with other features of the Act directed at the same 
problem. Section ll(b) of the Act, applicable nationwide, prohibits the 
intimidation, threatening, or coercion of any person for voting or at-
329. See supra text accompanying notes 16, 33 & 45. 
330. See supra text accompanying notes 50-54. 
331. 42 u.s.c. § 1973i(b) (1982). 
332. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 54-55 ("[f]he jurisdiction must take reasonable 
steps to eliminate [the] danger and to make it clear that such abhorrent activity by private citizens, 
officials or public employees, will not be tolerated within its territory."); 1981 HousE REPORT, 
supra note 76, at 43. 
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tempting to vote by any "person, whether acting under color of law or 
o{kerwise ."333 
• · Apart from the coverage problems previously described, there re-
mains the interpretive question of the kind of efforts that are required 
once the obligation to make constructive efforts has been determined to 
exist. The House Judiciary Committee Report simply declares that a 
covered jurisdiction must take steps to ensure that intimidation and 
harassment "will not be repeated, including giving notice within its ter-
ritory that such conduct will not be tolerated."334 The Senate Judiciary 
Report is equally unilluminating, but does add that the jurisdiction 
need do no more than "take reasonable steps" to eliminate the 
problem. 335 
The kinds of efforts that will be required, however, necessarily must 
vary depending on the nature of the harassment and intimidation that 
occurs. If actions of government voting registrars or poll workers are 
involved, the covered jurisdiction seeking bailout should be required to 
demonstrate that it took prompt action to investigate complaints and to 
discipline or discharge such officials if harassment or intimidation were 
found to exist. The covered jurisdiction should also demonstrate that it 
undertook efforts to instruct election officials concerning the need to 
avoid actions that might be interpreted as intimidating or constituting 
harassment. Additionally, to the extent intimidation or harassment of 
minority voters has occurred through the action of private parties, the 
covered jurisdiction should be required to investigate complaints 
promptly and, if found meritorious, to prosecute offenders under state 
or local law, and to publicize the existence of federal and state laws 
prohibiting the harassment or intimidation of voters and the intent of 
the jurisdiction to enforce such laws. 
3. Other Constructive Efforts 
The final aspect of the affirmative action component requires a cov-
ered jurisdiction to demonstrate that it has "engaged in other construc-
tive efforts, such as expanded opportunity for convenient registration 
and voting for every person of voting age and the appointment of mi-
nority persons as election officials throughout the jurisdiction and at all 
333. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 11(b), 79 Stat. 443 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973i(b) (1982)) (emphasis added). 
334. 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 43. 
335. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 54. 
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stages of the election and registration process."336 The House Judiciary 
Committee Report succinctly summarized this requirement as mandat-
ing that a covered jurisdiction demonstrate that it has undertaken con-
structive efforts "to expand the opportunities for minority citizens to 
register and vote."337 
Evidence was presented at both the House and Senate hearings indi-
cating that restrictive registration practices and procedures, including 
the practices of periodic purging of voter lists and re-registration re-
quirements, exist in many jurisdictions.338 The 1981 report of the Civil 
Rights Commission also documented the existence of barriers to voter 
registration and the fact that restrictive registration practices are espe-
cially burdensome for rural and low income people. 339 
The House and Senate Judiciary Committee Reports suggest that 
covered jurisdictions can meet this requirement by offering weekend 
and evening registration hours or by providing for postcard registra-
tion.340 Other suggested examples of efforts that will suffice include the 
appointment of minority citizens as deputy registrars, poll workers, and 
other positions which indicate to minority group members that they are 
encouraged to participate in the electoral process.341 
Unlike the previously described constructive efforts requirements, 
this provision apparently is not triggered by the presence of some prac-
tice or situation that needs to be corrected. All covered jurisdictions 
will be required to demonstrate that constructive efforts have been 
taken to increase minority pariticpation in the electoral process. The 
statutory enumeration of the types of activities required does not pur-
port to be exhaustive, and as the Senate Judiciary Committee Report 
states, this requirement is a "flexible one" depending on the "needs and 
conditions" within the covered jurisdiction.342 
Earlier in this Article, it was noted that statements appear in both the 
House and Senate Judiciary Committee Reports suggesting that low or 
disparate levels of minority participation in the electoral process should 
336. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(4)(F)(iii), 96 Stat. 132 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(i)(F)(iii) (1982)). 
337. 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 43. 
338. 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 289-98, 988-93; 1981 House Hearings, supra note 
54, at 173, 377-79, 820. 
339. UNFULFILLED GoALS, supra note 47, at 24-28. 
340. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 55; 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 43-44. 
341. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 55; 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 43-44. 
342. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 55. 
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preclude bailout.343 These statements appear in sections of the reports 
dealing with a covered jurisdiction's statutory obligation to provide the 
court with data concerning levels of minority participation. 344 As pre-
viously stated, while this statutory evidentiary requirement does not 
appear to impose an independent bailout requirement, the level of mi-
nority participation on both an absolute and relative basis would ap-
pear to be clearly relevant to the question whether the covered 
jurisdiction has met the constructive efforts component of the bailout 
standard. A low level of minority participation in the electoral process 
would suggest that additional constructive efforts to eliminate the dis-
criminatory structure of the electoral system are needed or that existing 
activities have not been successful or sufficient. In either case, bailout 
could be denied, not because of low levels of minority participation as 
such, but because the jurisdiction failed to meet the constructive efforts 
requirement. 
V. POST-BAILOUT PROBATION 
The 1982 amendments retain a provision found in the original ver-
sion of the Act that provided for a probationary period for covered 
jurisdictions which are successful in their bailout suits. Under the orig-
inal version of the Act, the court that granted the declaratory judgment 
terminating coverage retained jurisdiction of the matter for a period of 
five years, and could reopen the action upon motion of the Attorney 
General and rescind the bailout order upon a showing that during such 
five-year period the covered jurisdiction had employed a test or device 
for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to 
vote on account of race or color or in contravention of the Act's minor-
ity language provisions. 345 The original Act, in other words, provided 
for re-coverage in the event the jurisdiction engaged in any act during 
the five-year period following termination of coverage that would have 
precluded bailout if such act had occurred during the five- (later 
amended to seventeen-) year period prior to the order terminating cov-
erage. This recapture provision was applied prior to the 1982 amend-
ments in the case of three New York counties that had successfully 
obtained bailout in 1972 and were re-covered two years later upon mo-
343. Ste supra notes 184-92 and accompanying text. 
344. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 55; 1981 HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 44;see 
supra text accompanying notes 188-89. 
345. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 438 (amended 1970). 
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tion of the Attorney GeneraP46 
The recapture provision under the original Act, therefore, was rela-
tively uncomplicated. The sole question under the original bailout 
standard was whether the covered jurisdiction had used a test or device, 
as defined by the Act, as a prerequisite to registration or voting during 
the applicable statutory period.347 If not, bailout was permitted. Until 
the 1970 amendments, termination of coverage not only exempted the 
covered jurisdiction from the preclearance requirement, it also restored 
the right to use tests or devices as a prerequisite to registration or vot-
ing.348 Beginning in 1970, on a temporary basis, the prohibition on the 
use of tests and devices was extended nationwide;349 the ban ultimately 
was made permanent in 1975.350 The post-bailout restoration of the 
right to utilize tests or devices as prerequisites to registration and vot-
ing, therefore, was rendered moot by the 1970 and 1975 amendments. 
A covered jurisdiction's post-bailout use of tests or devices was a viola-
tion of the Act in itself, just as it would be for any non-covered jurisdic-
tion. Bailout did, of course, exempt the jurisdiction from the other 
special provisions of the Act, including the preclearance mandate. The 
probationary device prior to the 1982 amendments, therefore, simply 
added an additional disincentive for covered jurisdictions during the 
five-year period following termination of coverage. The use of a test or 
device during the five-year period by the jurisdiction not only would 
constitute a violation of the Act (as it would for any jurisdiction), it 
would also constitute grounds for restoring the jurisdiction's coverage 
under the Act's special provisions, including the preclearance 
requirement. 
The 1982 recapture provisions, however, are more complex and con-
tain a major ambiguity. The 1982 amendments provide that the district 
court retains jurisdiction for ten years after the bailout declaratory 
judgment and "shall reopen the action upon motion of the Attorney 
General or any aggrieved person alleging that conduct has occurred 
346. TEN YEARS AFTER, supra note 5, at 220. 
347. See supra text accompanying notes 27, 32 & 42. 
348. Section 4(a) of the original version of the Act merely suspended the right of covered 
jurisdictions to use tests and devices. Bailout, under the original version, would restore the right 
to use tests and devices. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 438 
(amended 1970, 1975, 1982). See Gaston County v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 678, 681 (D.D.C. 
1968), qffd, 395 u.s. 285 (1969). 
349. See supra text accompanying note 34. 
350. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
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which, had that conduct occurred during the [ten-year period preceding 
bailout], would have precluded [the bailout declaratory judgment]."351 
The recapture provision goes on to provide that the district court: 
shall vacate the [bailout] declaratory judgment ... if ... a final judg-
ment against the State or subdivision [that obtained the bailout judgment] 
. . . or against any governmental unit within that State or subdivision, 
determines that denials or abridgements of the right to vote on account of 
race or color have occurred anywhere in the territory of such State or 
political subdivision . . . or if, after the issuance of such [bailout] declara-
tory judgment, a consent decree, settlement, or agreement has been en-
tered into resulting in any abandonment of a voting practice challenged 
on such grounds.352 
This recapture provision, therefore, directs that a bailout order shall 
be vacated for certain kinds of final judgments, consent decrees, settle-
ments, or agreements. The final judgments, consent decrees, settle-
ments, or agreements that require re-coverage, however, are only four 
among numerous other previously described criteria that must be met 
for the ten-year period prior to bailout and which apparently also con-
stitute grounds for reopening the case. The 1982 amendments, there-
fore, are susceptible to an interpretation that bailout judgments may be 
reopened for any one of a variety of reasons, while the bailout judg-
ment itself will be set aside only for limited reasons. Such an interpre-
tation is hardly plausible. The more reasonable interpretation of the 
1982 amendments is that the bailout declaratory judgment can be re-
opened and set aside, in the discretion of the court, upon allegation and 
proof that the covered jurisdiction has engaged in any conduct during 
the ten-year period following bailout which, had that conduct occurred 
during the ten-year period prior to the bailout declaratory judgment, 
would have precluded granting the bailout judgment. If, however, the 
allegation and proof involve the specified types of final judgments, con-
sent decrees, settlements, or agreements during the ten-year period fol-
lowing bailout (all factors which, had they occurred during the ten-year 
351. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(5)(B), 96 Stat. 1:33 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § l973b(a)(5) (1982)). The original version of the Act authorized reopening 
the judgment for a period of five years, and only upon motion of the Attorney General. 
352. Id This section also provides that the bailout declaratory judgment shall be vacated in 
the case of covered jurisdictions subject to the special provisions because of the minority language 
provisions when a final judgment has been entered anywhere in the territory of the covered juris-
diction determining that the right to vote was denied or abridged in contravention of the special 
minority language provisions. ld 
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period preceding the bailout judgment, would have precluded granting 
the judgment), the court lacks discretion to set aside the bailout order 
and must vacate the judgment. This interpretation of the language of 
the 1982 amendments is supported (albeit indirectly) by the House and 
Senate Judiciary Committee Reports, as both refer to the possibility of 
recapture for reasons other than the specified final judgments, consent 
decrees, settlements, or agreements.353 
Apart from the ambiguity previously described, it is likely that the 
recapture provision will cause numerous interpretive problems. The 
test for reopening and, apparently, vacating the order terminating cov-
erage is activity during the ten-year period following bailout that 
would have precluded bailout had that conduct occurred during the 
ten-year period prior to the bailout judgment. The previous discussion 
of both the specific compliance and the affirmative action components 
of the bailout criteria disclosed the existence of a variety of require-
ments that must be met to achieve bailout, some of which are highly 
ambiguous. For example, the absence of constructive efforts to end 
intimidation and harassment of voters or to increase minority partici-
pation in the electoral process will preclude bailout. Does the proba-
tionary standard require the continuation of such efforts during the ten-
year period following bailout? Will the absence of such efforts follow-
ing termination of coverage, if such efforts were required as a condition 
of bailout, constitute conduct that has "occurred" that would have pre-
cluded bailout? 
More importantly, would a post-bailout change in a voting practice 
or procedure that would have violated the preclearance standard if im-
plemented prior to termination of coverage constitute grounds for re-
capture? If so, then the probationary period, in effect, merely 
constitutes an extension of the preclearance mandate without the for-
mality of prior Justice Department or court approval. The Senate Judi-
ciary Committee Report appears to accept this construction of the Act, 
as it asserts that recapture will be appropriate if the jurisdiction re-
adopts a voting change that has been objected to previously under sec-
tion 5.354 The probationary period, therefore, appears to place covered 
jurisdictions in the posture of complying with the substantive standard 
of the preclearance mandate for an additional ten-year period follow-
353. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 56; 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 45, 
See infra text accompanying notes 354-57. 
354. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 56. 
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ing bailout, subject to the qualification that prior approval of changes 
in voting practices and procedures need not be obtained. A new voting 
practice or procedure enacted during the probationary period having a 
discriminatory purpose or effect, as judged by the section 5 standards, 
will constitute grounds for recapture. 
Both the House and Senate Judiciary Committee reports emphasize 
that a decision to reopen the bailout determination should not auto-
matically result in the setting aside of the bailout order.355 The deci-
sion to reinstate coverage under the Act's special provisions should 
only be made if the jurisdiction is found to have engaged in the prohib-
ited conduct.356 The statute makes no provision for the burden of 
proof in the recapture proceedings; presumably, therefore, the burden 
of proof will be on the government to establish the grounds for 
recapture. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Senate Judiciary Committee asserted that the goal of the revised 
bailout system "is to give covered jurisdictions an incentive to elimi-
nate practices denying or abridging opportunities for minorities to par-
ticipate in the political process."357 The Committee went on to add that 
"[e]ach and every requirement of the bailout is minimally necessary to 
measure a jurisdiction's record of non-discrimination in voting."358 
These observations by the Senate Judiciary Committee provide a sound 
basis for the conclusion that the 1982 revisions to the bailout system 
mark a major change in the objectives of the Voting Rights Act. 
Following the 1970 amendments to the Act, when Congress imposed 
a nationwide ban on the use of tests and devices as prerequisites to 
voting, the major objective of the special provisions of the Act was to 
ensure that covered jurisdictions could not implement new registration 
or voting practices and procedures which had the purpose or effect of 
denying the right to vote on account of race or color; that is, the 
preclearance requirement was the major enforcement device to ensure 
nondiscriminatory voting practices and procedures in the covered juris-
dictions. Moreover, recall that prior to the 1982 amendments, noncom-
pliance with the preclearance requirement exacted no additional 
355. /d.; 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 45. 
356. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 56; 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 45. 
357. 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 77, at 59. 
358. /d. 
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sanction. The sole sanction for noncompliance was invalidation of the 
change. Finally, section 2, applicable nationwide, could be used to 
challenge existing registration and voting practices and procedures; but 
problems of proof, even under an effects or results standard, in all like-
lihood would prevent successful challenges to many allegedly discrimi-
natory practices. 
A straight twenty-five-year extension of the special provisions, there-
fore, even when joined with an amendment to section 2 to impose a 
results or effects standard of proof, did not, in the opinion of many, 
provide an adequate remedy for the most serious discriminatory prac-
tices, nor would such changes solve the continuing problem of noncom-
pliance with the preclearance requirement. While it would not be 
accurate to conclude that maintenance of the preclearance requirement 
for an additional twenty-five years was not considered by Congress to 
be important in its own right, it is clear that under the revised bailout 
system covered jurisdictions will be held hostage to the preclearance 
requirement for the purpose of securing voluntary action to achieve 
collateral objectives. It is permissible, therefore, to describe the 1982 
bailout amendments as designed to induce action by covered jurisdic-
tions to eliminate certain voting practices and procedures that may not, 
as such, constitute violations of the Act; that is, release from the special 
provisions now is conditioned upon voluntary action by covered juris-
dictions to eliminate voting practices and procedures that may not in 
themselves constitute independent violations oflaw. In this respect, the 
1982 amendments may be described as an extension of the special pro-
visions for an additional twenty-five years, but only for those covered 
jurisdictions that are unwilling or unable to meet the bailout criteria 
(which, in tum, require covered jurisdictions to meet additional affirm-
ative obligations not otherwise required). It is true, of course, that a 
significant portion of the bailout criteria attempt to measure compli-
ance with the preclearance and other obligations imposed. The 1982 
amendments to the bailout system, therefore, accomplish a twofold 
change in emphasis: continuation of the special provisions-the 
preclearance requirement being by far the most important-for an ad-
ditional twenty-five years, but only for those jurisdictions that do not 
develop good track records of compliance with the preclearance re-
quirement and those that do not undertake voluntary efforts to elimi-
nate other forms of discriminatory practices. 
It remains to be seen, of course, whether the new system of incentives 
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will work. Both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees asserted 
that the standards are achievable and that good faith efforts will result 
in significant numbers of covered jurisdictions securing the exemp-
tion.359 Congress, however, implicitly acknowledged that the criteria 
might be too stringent, and bailout unachievable in fact, by adding a 
provision to the Act requiring a review of the law after fifteen years of 
operation.360 The foregoing analysis, moreover, demonstrates that the 
standards are ambiguous in many instances. Judicial interpretation of 
the criteria will be required and is likely to present a substantial burden 
for the District of Columbia District Court361-not just because of the 
ambiguity of the standards, but also because of the large number of 
suits that likely will arise pursuant to the amendment permitting polit-
ical subdivisions to bailout independently of the covered state. 
359. /d. at 60; 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 32. 
360. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(7), 96 Stat. 133 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(7) (1982)). 
361. The 1982 amendments also contain a provision designed to lessen the impact of the ex-
pected increase in the number of bailout suits filed. If no hearing is held within two years of the 
fihng of an action, the chief judge of the District Court for the District of Columbia may request 
additional resources to expedite the actions. /d. § 2(b)(6), 96 Stat. 133 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973b(a)(6) (1982)). 

